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ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA: FROM TITLE TO LAND
TO TERRRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
Kent McNeil*
Despite vacillations in policy from treaty acknowledgement of tribal
sovereignty and land rights through removal, allotment, reorganization,
termination and self-determination,1 the doctrinal foundations of Indian
law have been fairly well settled in the United States since the Marshall
Court decisions of the 1820s and 1830s. 2 Not so in Canada, where the
courts are only beginning to address some major Aboriginal rights
issues.3 Prominent among these are the issue of the nature of Aboriginal
rights to land (commonly known as Aboriginal title), and the question of
whether the Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right of self-government.4
Typically, Canadian courts have approached Aboriginal title and self-
government as distinct issues, to be decided in virtual isolation from one
another.5 This article will examine recent case law addressing these issues,
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. I would like to thank Professors Hamar
Foster and Brian Slattery for their very helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. For overviews, see generally Co-EN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-206
(1982) [hereinafter COHEN's HANDBOOK]; VINE DELORIA, JR., AND CLIFFORD M. LYTLE,
AMEmCAN INDIANs, AMERIcAN JusTicE 1-24 (1983).
2. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
3. The term "Aboriginal rights" is used in Canadian law to refer to the rights the Abo-
riginal peoples have as a result of their existence as peoples with distinctive cultures and
traditions, and their occupation and use of lands prior to European colonization. The Abo-
riginal peoples are constitutionally defined to include "the Indian, Inuit and M~tis peoples of
Canada": Constitution Act, 1982 (being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, (U.K.) 1982,
c.11), s. 35 (2).
4. In the United States an inherent right of Indian self-government, in the form of tribal
sovereignty, was acknowledged by Marshall C.J. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832). This concept has been one of the foundations of Indian law ever since: see gener-
ally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 232-57; CHARLES F. WiLKiNsoN, AMERiCAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(1987).
5. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991) 79 D.L.R.4th 185 (B.C.S.C.), re-
versed in part (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470 (B.C.C.A.), appeal allowed in part and new trial
ordered (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193.
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and propose a conceptual framework for Aboriginal territorial rights that
encompasses both Aboriginal title and self-government.
L THE NATURE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
Ever since the 1888 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council6 in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,7 Cana-
dian law has acknowledged the existence of Aboriginal title to land. For
the Privy Council, the source of that title was the Royal Proclamation of
1763,8 by which the British Crown recognized and protected the rights of
the Indian nations to the lands they occupied until they chose to dispose of
them, in which case they could be purchased only by the Crown.9 This
provision for sale of Indian lands to the Crown formed the basis for the
land surrender treaties in Canada, by which the Indian parties gave up
some of their land rights in return for treaty rights.'0 However, when the
6. Appeals from Canadian decisions could be taken to the Privy Council in London until
1933 in criminal cases, and 1949 in civil cases, when the Supreme Court of Canada became the
final court of appeal. See JAMES G. SNELL AND FREDERICK VAUGHAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA: HISTORY OFTHE INSTITUTION 178-95 (1985).
7. (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46. Note that reliance on the St. Catherine's case as a precedent is
problematic, given that the trial judge's factual findings were influenced by explicitly prejudi-
cial attitudes towards Indians. See Donald Smith, Aboriginal Rights a Century Ago: The St.
Catherines Milling Case of 1885 Hardened Attitudes Toward Native Land Claims, 67:1 THE
BEAVER 4 (1987); Anthony J. Hall, The St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company versus
the Queen: Indian Land Rights as a Factor in Federal-Provincial Relations in Nineteenth-
Century Canada, in KERRY ABEL AND JEAN FRIESEN, eds., ABORIGINAL RESOURCE USE IN
CANADA: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 267 (1991); Kent McNeil, Social Darwinism and
Judicial Conceptions of Indian Title in Canada in the 1880s, in JOURNAL OF THE WEST (1999).
See generally Catherine Bell and Michael Asch, Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of
Precedent in Aboriginal Rights Litigation, in MICHAEL ASCH, ed., ABORIGINAL AND TREATY
RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 38 (1997)
[hereinafter ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS], arguing that aspects of judicial decisions based
on dated, ethnocentric attitudes should not be used as precedents in current Aboriginal rights
litigation.
8. Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 1I, No. 1.
9. For detailed analysis of the Indian provisions of the Proclamation, see generally BRIAN
SL.TTERY, THm LAND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CANADIAN PEOPLES 191-349 (1979). See also
John Borrows, Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the
Royal Proclamation, 28 UNIVERSITY'OF BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1994), using the
historical context and Aboriginal understanding of the Proclamation to argue that it affirmed
Aboriginal sovereignty as well as land rights.
10. Interpretation of the land surrender provisions in the treaties remains controversial, as
Aboriginal people often assert that provisions that look like absolute surrenders on their face
really distort the understanding of the parties that the lands would be shared. See Re Paulette
and Registrar of Titles (No. 2) (1973) 42 D.L.R.3d 8 (N.W.T.S.C.), reversed on other grounds
(1975) 63 D.L.R. 3d I (N.W.T.C.A.), sub nom. Paulette v. The Queen [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628;
DELIA OPEKOKEW, THE FIRST NATIONS: INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CANADIAN
CONFEDERATION 9-13 (1980); RICHARD PRICE, ed., THE SPIRIT OF THE ALBERTA INDIAN
TREATIES (1987); Patrick Macklem, The Impact of Treaty 9 on Resource Development in
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Proclamation's connection with Aboriginal title was re-examined in 1973
by the Supreme Court of Canada in its landmark decision in Calder v. At-
torney-General of British Columbia, the Court decided that Aboriginal title
is an independent legal right that does not depend on the Proclamation for
its existence." That position was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Guerin v. The Queen, where Dickson J. concluded that the Indian "interest
in their lands is a pre-existing legal right not created by Royal Proclama-
tion ... or by any other executive act or legislative provision.'
' 2
An aspect of the St. Catherine's decision that has remained important
is the Privy Council's pronouncement that Aboriginal title, while not
amounting to a fee simple estate, is nonetheless an interest in land.13 This
must mean that it is proprietary in nature." Delivering the Privy Council's
opinion, Lord Watson described "the tenure of the Indians" as "a personal
and usufructuary right", a description that has sometimes been misinter-
preted to mean that their interest is non-proprietary.' 5 However, as Lord
Watson based that description on the words of the Royal Proclamation,
which he regarded as the source of Aboriginal title, he could not have in-
Northern Ontario, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS, supra note 7, 97 at 108-120; Sharon
Venne, Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY
RIGHTS, supra note 7, 173 at 192-202.
i1. [1973] S.C.R. 313, per Judson J. at 322-23, 328, Hall J. (dissenting on other issues) at
394,396-97.
12. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 379. See also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, 242.
13. While declining to specify the precise nature of Aboriginal title, Lord Watson said that it
was "an interest other than that of the Province" (of Ontario, where the land was located), and
that that interest was a burden on the provincial Crown's underlying title to the land- St. Cath-
erine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46, 58 (P.C.). See also Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 1, where the British
Columbia Court of Appeal relied on the St. Catherine's decision to hold unanimously that Abo-
riginal title is an encumbrance on the Crown's title, and can include rights to standing timber.
Compare R. v. Paul (1998) 158 D.L.R. 4th 231 (N.B.C.A.).
14. See Kent McNeil, The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-
jacket, in MATr BRAY AND ASHLEY THOMSON, eds., rEMAGAMI: A DEBATE ON WILDERNESS
185, at 189-91 (1990). Compare Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs [1980] 1
F.C. 518,577 (T.D.).
15. See Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. I (H.C. Aust.), per Deane and Gau-
dron JJ. at 88-89. For critical commentary on their interpretation, see generally Kent McNeil,
Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title, 1 AUSTRALIAN
INDIGENOUS LAW REPORTE. 181, 205-07 (1996). Compare R. v. Paul (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th
131, 174 (N.B.Q.B.) (reversed on the issue of the existence of the rights, (1998) 158 D.L.R. 4th
231 (N.B.C.A.)), where Turnbull J. concluded that
the Indians of New Brunswick do have land rights and that such are treaty
rights. I believe it is like a usufructuary right. It does not matter what such
rights are called. It is not a right restricted to personal use, but a full blown
right of beneficial ownership and possession in keeping with the concept of
this is our land - that is your land. [emphasis added]
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tended it to apply to the Aboriginal title the Supreme Court has now found
to pre-date that document.1 6 Moreover, subsequent Privy Council and Su-
preme Court of Canada decisions have made clear that Aboriginal title is "a
personal right in the sense that it is in its nature inalienable except by sur-
render to the Crown."'7 In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, the Supreme
Court rejected an interpretation of the St. Catherine's decision that "Indian
title is merely a personal right which cannot be elevated to the status of a
proprietary interest so as to compete on an equal footing with other pro-
prietary interests."'" The Court affirmed that Indian title "was characterized
as purely personal for the sole purpose of emphasizing its generally inal-
ienable nature; it could not be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone
other than the Crown."' 9
Until the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia,2' interpretation and modification of the St. Catherine's
description of Aboriginal title failed to produce clear answers to questions
of the title's nature. In an oft-quoted passage in Calder v. Attorney-General
of British Columbia, Judson J. said:
the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in so-
cieties and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This
is what Indian title means and it does not help one in the solution of this prob-
lem to call it a 'personal or usufructuary right.'
21
While this suggested that Aboriginal title stems from occupation of land
prior to European colonization, the relevance of the fact that Aboriginal
peoples were organized in societies was not explained.22 It may be that
Judson J.'s reference to this rather obvious fact was meant to support the
Canadian judicial position that Aboriginal title is communal in nature,u but
nothing in his judgment stated that explicitly.
In the Guerin case, Dickson J. said that the Calder decision "recog-
16. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
17. Attomey-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada [1921] 1 A.C. 401, 408
(P.C.). See also Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 382.
18. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654,677.
19. Id. Lamer C.J. affirmed this aspect of Canadian Pacific in Delgamuukw v. British Co-
lumbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,241, reiterating that the "personal" description relates only to
inalienability, and "does not mean that aboriginal title is a non-proprietary interest which
amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the land and cannot compete on an equal
footing with other proprietary interests."
20. (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193.
21. [1973] S.C.R. 313, 328.
22. Compare Mark Walters, British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A
Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 17 QUEEN's LAW JOURNAL 350, 407-09 (1992),
arguing that the organized society dimension entails a continuity model of Aboriginal rights,
based on the existence of Aboriginal legal systems prior to European colonization. •
23. See also infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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nized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic oc-
cupation and possession of their tribal lands." 24 He also referred to the
principle, approved by the Privy Council in Anodu Tijani v. Secretary,
Southern Nigeriaz "that a change in sovereignty over a particular territory
does not in general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants".26 He
went on to review Canadian decisions dealing with Aboriginal title and the
Indian interest in reserve lands (which he regarded as the same), and said
that the St. Catherine's description of that title as a "personal and usufruc-
tuary right" and other judicial descriptions of the Indian interest in reserve
lands as a "beneficial interest" each contain a "core of truth".2 However, in
his view the problems in defining the title stem from the use of terms
drawn from general property law that do not entirely fit the "sui generis
interest which the Indians have." '2 He concluded that the Indian interest in
Aboriginal and reserve lands is
best characterized by its general inalienability [other than by surrender to the
Crown], coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal
with the land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered. Any de-
scription of Indian title which goes beyond these two features is both unneces-
sary and potentially misleading.
29
With all due respect, this description was not particularly helpful, as it told
us nothing about the nature of Aboriginal title apart from affirming the
well-established rule that it is generally inalienable."
This brings us to the pivotal case of Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia,3' in which the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples asked for a
declaration acknowledging both their title to their territories and the
authority of their traditional governments to exercise jurisdiction over
those territories and their peoples. 32 At trial, McEachern C.j. held that any
24. Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335,376.
25. [1921] 2A.C. 399.
26. Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 378.
27. Id. at 379-82.
28. Id. at 382.
29. Id.
30. The same rule applies to Indian title in the United States: see Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). For analysis and criticism of the rule, see KENT MCNEL, COMMON
LAW ABORIGINALTInTE221-35 (1989). Note that the second part of Dickson J.'s description of
Indian tile relates to the imposition of a fiduciary duty on the Crown when Indian lands are
surrendered: for detailed discussion, see LEONARD IAN ROTMAN, PARALLEL PATHS: FIDUCIARY
DOCTRINE AND THE CROWN-NATiVE RELATIONSHIP IN CANADA (1996). While that aspect of his
description is vitally important (especially as the duty. was established for the first time in Ca-
nadian law in Guerin), it does not assist us in determining the nature of Aboriginal title.
31. (1991) 79 D.L.R. 4th 185 (B.C.S.C.), reversed in part (1993) 104 D.L.R.(4th) 470
(B.C.C.A.), appeal allowed in part and new trial ordered (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193.
32. Id. In effect, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en were requesting recognition of their territo-
1998]
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Aboriginal land rights and governmental powers the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en may have had prior to European colonization had been ex-
tinguished by the time British Columbia joined Canada as its sixth prov-
ince in 1871." 3 The British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed by a majority
of three to two that the governmental authority of those peoples had been
extinguished (we will return to this issue in Part 2 below), but held that
their Aboriginal land rights had not been extinguished, as the Crown had
not met the onus of proving extinguishment by clear and plain legislative
intent.34 Given this holding, those rights would have been in existence and
would have received constitutional protection in 1982 by section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982,15 which provides: "35.(1) The existing aborigi-
nal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recog-
nized and affirmed.
36
As the Court of Appeal upheld the Aboriginal land rights of the
Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples in Delgamuukw, the nature of those
rights became an issue. The judges did not actually resolve this matter, as
the parties agreed to try to settle it by negotiation. Nonetheless, the judges
did express some general opinions on the nature of Aboriginal land rights.37
Macfarlane J.A. (Taggart J.A. concurring), in the leading majority
judgment, regarded those rights as variable from one Aboriginal society to
rial and sovereign rights much like the recognition accorded to the Cherokee Nation by the
United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
33. For commentary on this decision, see generally Walters, supra note 22; FRANK CASsIDY,
ed., ABORIGINAL TIL IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW v. THE QuEEN (1992).
34. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R. 4th 470, 519-39, 589-93, 595, 660-
89, 724-30, 753-54, 761-64. The "clear and plain" test for extinguishment of Aboriginal rights
was articulated by Hall J. (dissenting) in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia
[1973] S.C.R. 313, 404, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1075, 1099; see also R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, 748-751; R. v. Adams
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 129-30; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,
270-71.
35. Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11.
36. While section 35(1) protects Aboriginal and treaty rights from infringement by federal
and provincial legislation and executive action, that protection is not absolute. Constitutional
amendment aside, those rights can no longer be extinguished without the consent of the Abo-
riginal peoples (unlike in the United States, where Congress has "plenary" power in this regard:
see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 217-220; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 78-82), but
they can still be infringed by federal and provincial legislation if the infringement is justified by
proof of a valid legislative objective and consistency with the Crown's fiduciary duty to the
Aboriginal peoples: see R. v. Sparrow [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771;
R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. C&t6 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R. 4th 193. Although the issues of infringement and justification are
of vital importance in Canadian Aboriginal rights law, this article will only touch on them
briefly in the context of the connection between Aboriginal title and self-government: see infra
text accompanying notes 199-210.
37. For detailed analysis of this aspect of the judgments, see Kent McNeil, The Meaning of
Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 135.
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another, depending on "patterns of historical occupancy and use of land."38
Moreover, for him Aboriginal rights are based on traditions and practices
that were "integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal society" prior
to European acquisition of sovereignty; a practice "which became preva-
lent as a result of European influences would not qualify for protection as
an aboriginal right" 39
Wallace J., in his concurring majority judgment, expressed the view
that Aboriginal rights are "site and activity specific".' Like Macfarlane
J.A., he said they "reflect the traditional practices which were integral to
the native society occupying tribal lands when the common law was intro-
duced. ' 41 In his opinion, Aboriginal title "may range from an exclusive
and plenary beneficial interest over certain parcels of land, to occasional
presence for sustenance activities. A host of practices fall within the cate-
gory including fishing, hunting and gathering." 42
Lambert J.A., dissenting in part, took a somewhat different approach
to the temporal aspect of Aboriginal land rights. While agreeing that
"[t]hose rights must have their origin in a custom, tradition or practice of
the aboriginal society which preceded settlement and sovereignty and
which formed an integral part of their distinctive culture," 3 he went on to
say that "aboriginal rights are evolving rights. They are not frozen at the
time of sovereignty or at any other time. The evolution which occurred
before sovereignty and the evolution which occurred after sovereignty are
both relevant to an understanding of the rights." 44 Like Wallace J.A., he
also thought there could be different sorts of Aboriginal land rights, de-
pending on the degree of connection with or use of the land. If an Aborigi-
nal people established exclusive occupation, apparently they would have
"an encompassing and general right" that would carry with it "the right to
enjoy the fruits of the land including the game."'45 In that case,
taking game is not the right in question. Taking game is just a way of exercis-
ing a broader right to the exclusive occupation, possession, use and enjoyment
of land. The situation would be different if the aboriginal practice was to hunt
38. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470,496.
39. Id. at 492-97.
40. Id. at 572. In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (1997) 153 D.L.R.
4th 1, 17-18, Esson J.A. said that Aboriginal title claims are "fact and site specific" and can
include a right to standing timber.
41. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470,571.
42. Id. at573.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id. at 648. While Lambert J.A. did not specify how Aboriginal rights might evolve after
acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown, he apparently linked this to a continuing right of self-
government, which the Aboriginal peoples can exercise to change their customs, traditions and
practices: see McNeil, supra note 37, at 147-48.
45. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470,648.
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game on land to which no exclusive occupation was claimed. If the aboriginal
right was limited to a particular season, and a particular purpose, then the con-
temporary exercise of that right could be limited also in the same way, even
though modem tools could be used in the exercise of the right.
46
Hutcheon . also dissented in part in Delgamuukw, but had little to say
about the nature of Aboriginal title. On that issue, he simply listed the
characteristics of Aboriginal land rights that were not in dispute - namely,
that they extend to the Aboriginal people's traditional territory, are collec-
tive, and are inalienable except to the Crown.4 7 To this, he added that they
"are of such a nature as to compete on an equal footing with proprietary
interests.'4
The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion, handed down on December 11, 1997,49 is a landmark in Canadian
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. In it, the Court overturned the decision of
the Court of Appeal and ordered a new trial, as the pleadings did not corre-
spond with the actual claims that were made on appeal, and the trial judge
applied incorrect principles in assessing the oral histories of the Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en peoples. Nonetheless, in delivering the leading judg-
ment of the Supreme Court, Lamer C.L took the time to lay down some
vital principles of law to guide the judge at the new trial.50 In particular, he
provided direction on the use of oral histories, the content and proof of
Aboriginal title, and federal and provincial powers over Aboriginal rights.
However, the claim to a right of self-government was remitted to trial
without further guidance from the Court, as the complexity of the issues
and the lack of adequate submissions on them led Lamer C.J. to conclude
that "this is not the right case for the Court to lay down the legal principles
to guide future litigation" on self-government."
In this article, my assessment of the Supreme Court's decision in Del-
gamuukw will be directed mainly at Lamer C.J.'s comments on the content
46. Id.
47. Id. at 756-57.
48. Id. at 756. See also Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654, discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 18-19.
49. Delegamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193.
50. Lamer C.J.'s judgment was concurred in by Cory and Major JJ. La Forest J., L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. concurring, delivered a separate judgment, in which he agreed with Lamer C.J.'s dispo-
sition of the case, as well as with his views on federal and provincial powers, while taking a
somewhat more restrictive approach to the content of Aboriginal title. McLachlin J. stated: "I
concur with the Chief Justice. I add that I am also in substantial agreement with the comments
of Justice La Forest." Id. at 284.
51. Id. at 266. On self-government, La Forest J. agreed with Lamer CJ., that "there was
insufficient evidence before this Court to make any determination regarding this aspect of the
appellants' claim." Id. at 284.
260 [Vol. 5:253
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and proof of Aboriginal title. But before undertaking that assessment, it is
important to look at other relevant developments in Aboriginal rights law
that took place in the four year interval between the decisions of the Court
of Appeal and the Supreme Court in that case. In particular, we need to
consider the impact of three Supreme Court of Canada decisions involving
Aboriginal fishing rights that were handed down in 1996.
The first of these, R. v. Van der Peet,52 involved a claim by Dorothy
Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo nation in British Columbia, that her
Aboriginal right to fish included a right to exchange the fish she caught for
money or other goods. In his majority judgment, Lamer C.J. formulated a
test for determining how the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, are to be identified and de-
fined. Revealing the influence of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 3
he stated the test in these terms: "in order to be an aboriginal right an ac-
tivity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the
distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right."54 Lamer C.J.
then went on to specify the time period for application of this "integral to
the distinctive culture" test
The time period that a court should consider in identifying whether the right
claimed meets the standard of being integral to the aboriginal community
claiming the right is the period prior to contact between aboriginal and Euro-
pean societies. Because it is the fact that distinctive aboriginal societies lived
on the land prior to the arrival of Europeans that underlies the aboriginal rights
protected by s.35(l), it is to that pre-contact period that the courts must look in
identifying aboriginal rights.
55
Applying that test to Dorothy Van der Peet's claim, Lamer C.J. found that
exchange of fish for money or other goods had not been an integral part of
the Sto:lo people's distinctive culture before Europeans arrived, and so she
did not have an Aboriginal right to engage in that activity.
In the course of his judgment in Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. elaborated
on the integral to the distinctive culture test by presenting guidelines for its
application. The first thing that must be taken into account is the perspec-
tive of the Aboriginal people claiming the right. However, he qualified this
by stating that "that perspective must be framed in terms cognizable to the
52. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
53. In addition to the Delgamuukw decision, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 39-
43, see R. v. Van der Peet [1993] 5 W.W.R. 459 (B.C.C.A.), the decision that was appealed to
the Supreme Court. See also R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1099.
54. R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,549.
55. Id. at 554-55. Compare L'Heureux-Dub and McLachlin JJ.'s dissenting opinions at
596-602,633-36.
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Canadian legal and constitutional structure."'56 This is because "one of the
fundamental purposes of s.35(l) is the reconciliation of the pre-existence
of distinctive aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty,"
and "the only fair and just reconciliation is ... one which takes into account
the aboriginal perspective while at the same time taking into account the
perspective of the common law.
57
With those perspectives in mind, a court should identify the nature of
the claimed right, and proceed to determine whether the practice, custom or
tradition alleged to support it was "a central and significant part of the so-
ciety's distinctive culture ... - that it was one of the things that truly made
the society what it was. 58 However, while the practice, custom or tradition
must be distinctive in that it is a defining and central attribute of the society
(rather than just an incidental or occasional aspect), it does not have to be
distinct in the sense of being unique to that particular society.59
In addition to proving that the practice, custom or tradition was inte-
gral to their distinctive culture prior to European contact, to have an exist-
ing Aboriginal right the Aboriginal claimants also have to show continuity
with a present-day practice, culture or tradition.60 Lamer C.J. cautioned that
this requirement of continuity should be applied flexibly to prevent the
rights "from being frozen in pre-contact times., 61 He wrote that "[tihe
evolution of practices, customs and traditions into modem forms will not,
provided that continuity with pre-contact practices, customs and traditions
is demonstrated, prevent their protection as aboriginal rights."6 2
Lamer C.J's formulation of the integral to the distinctive culture test
and his time frame for its application were criticized by L'Heureux-Dub6
and McLachlin JJ. in their dissenting opinions in Van der Peet. They dis-
agreed with his approach to defining those rights, which they regarded as
too particularized. They favored a generic approach that would seek to
identify the rights more broadly, rather than focus on specific practices
relating to the exercise of those rights. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. put it this way.
s.35(l) should be viewed as protecting, not a catalogue of individualized prac-
tices, traditions or customs, as the Chief Justice does, but the 'distinctive cul-
ture' of which aboriginal activities are manifestations. Simply put, the empha-
sis would be on the significance of these activities to natives rather than on the
activities themselves.
63
56. Id. at 550.
57. Id. at 550-51.
58. Id. at 553 (Lamer CJ.'s emphasis).
59. Id. at 553,560-61.
60. Id. at 556.
61. Id. at 557.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 593 (L'Heureux-Dub J.'s emphasis).
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McLachlin J. found it
necessary to distinguish at the outset between an aboriginal right and the exer-
cise of an aboriginal right. Rights are generally cast in broad, general terms....
The exercise of rights, on the other hand, may take many forms and vary from
place to place and from time to time.
64
She went on to express her agreement with L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
that the Chief Justice defines the rights at issue with too much particularity,
enabling him to find no aboriginal right where a different analysis might find
one. By insisting that Mrs. Van der Peet's modem practice of selling fish be
replicated in pre-contact Sto:lo practices, he effectively condemns the Sto:lo to
exercise their right precisely as they exercised it hundreds of years ago and pre-
cludes a finding that the sale constitutes the exercise of an aboriginal right.65
With respect to Lamer C.J.'s time frame for application of the test,
their criticism was even more pointed. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. characterized
his use of a pre-contact time frame as a "frozen right" approach, which
"implies that aboriginal culture was crystallized in some sort of 'aboriginal
time' prior to the arrival of Europeans."' She observed that Lamer C.J.'s
approach "assumes that everything that the natives did after that date was
not sufficiently significant and fundamental to their culture and social or-
ganization." 7 Moreover, she found the date to be difficult to determine,
arbitrary, and inconsistent with Aboriginal perspectives on the effect of the
arrival of Europeans. She also thought that the test "imposes a heavy and
unfair burden [of proof] on the natives", and that it "embodies inappropri-
ate and unprovable assumptions about aboriginal culture and society."68 In
place of Lamer C.J.'s "frozen right" approach, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. favored
a "dynamic right" approach, by which Aboriginal rights would be "inter-
preted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time."69 In her view,
aboriginal rights must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in re-
lation to the needs of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs
change and evolve with the overall society in which they live. This generous,
large and liberal interpretation of aboriginal rights protected under s.35(1)
64. Id. at 631.
65. Id. at 632.
66. Id. at 596.
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id. at 597-98.
69. Id. at 599 (quoting R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1093).
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would ensure their continued vitality.
70
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concluded that as long as an activity had been an inte-
gral part of a distinctive Aboriginal culture for a "substantial continuous
period of time" - which for her meant from 20 to 50 years - it should be
protected as an Aboriginal right
71
While McLachlin J. was not prepared to go as far as L'Heureux-Dub6
J. on this issue, she did not agree with Lamer CJ.'s view "that it is essen-
tial that a practice be traceable to pre-contact times for it to qualify as a
constitutional right. Aboriginal rights find their source not in a magic
moment of European contact, but in the traditional laws and customs of
the aboriginal people in question."'72
So for McLachlin J., "the better question is what [aboriginal] laws and
customs held sway before superimposition of European laws and
customs."73 As an example, she pointed to the situation in parts of Western
Canada where
over a century elapsed between the first contact with Europeans and imposition
of "Canadian" or 'European" law. During this period, many tribes lived largely
unaffected by European laws and customs. I see no reason why evidence as to
the laws and customs and territories of the aboriginals in this interval should
not be considered in determining the nature and scope of their aboriginal
rights.74
Commentators on the Van der Peet decision have echoed the concerns
of L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ., and added objections of their
own.' Conferring authority on non-Aboriginal judges to decide what is
70. Id. at 599-600. Note that L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s "generous, large and liberal" interpreta-
tion of Aboriginal rights is amply supported by case law: see, e.g., Simon v. The Queen [1985]
2 S.C.R. 387, 402 (regarding treaty rights); R. v. Horseman [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 906-08, 930
(regarding earlier constitutional protections for hunting and fishing rights); R. v. Sparrow
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1106-08 (regarding s.35(1)). In fact, Lamer C.J. also affirmed and pur-
ported to apply this principle of interpretation in R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 536-
37 (though how he reconciled it with his narrow, time-orientated conception of Aboriginal
rights is difficult to understand).
71. R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,601-02.
72. Id. at 634.
73. Id. at 635.
74. Id.
75. See John Borrows, The Trickster: Integral to a Distinctive Culture, 8:2 CONSTITUTIONAL
FORUM 27 (1997); Leonard L Rotman, Hunting for Answers in a Strange Kettle of Fish: Uni-
lateralism, Paternalism and Fiduciary Rhetoric in Badger and Van der Peet, 8:2
CONSTrrUTIONAL FORUM 40 (1997); Kent McNeil, Reduction by Definition: The Supreme
Court's Treatment of Aboriginal Rights in 1996, 5: 3, 4 CANADA WATCH 60 (1997); Kent
McNeil, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?, 36 ALBERTA LAW
REVIEW 117 (1997) [hereinafter Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights]; Janice Gray, 0 Can-
ada! - Van der Peer as Guidance on the Construction of Native Title Rights, 2 AUSTRALIAN
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integral to the distinctive cultures of Aboriginal societies is obviously
problematic, given the potential for cultural misunderstanding and bias.76
Also, while Lamer C.J. said that Aboriginal perspectives have to be taken
into account, his test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights does not
appear to do so, as Aboriginal peoples generally would be unlikely to ac-
cept his historically-based definition of "Aboriginal., 77 Related to this is
the criticism that Lamer CJ.'s time-orientated approach to Aboriginal
rights is based on a misguided, static conception of cultures that does not
take account of the dynamic nature of human societies. His approach com-
pels Aboriginal peoples to choose either to live in the past in order to pre-
serve their Aboriginal rights, or to adapt to modem Canadian life and forgo
those rights. As the former is not a viable option, Lamer C.J.'s approach is
bound to lead to a loss of Aboriginal rights and eventual assimilation.
The other recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions that are relevant
to our discussion of the nature of Aboriginal title are R. v. Adams78 and R.
v. C6tg,79 both of which involved Aboriginal fishing rights in the province
of Quebec. While these decisions did not involve Aboriginal title as such,
they are nonetheless pertinent because the Supreme Court made important
pronouncements in them on the connection between Aboriginal title and
Aboriginal rights generally.80 In both cases, the Court had to decide
whether Aboriginal rights are necessarily based on Aboriginal title so that
an Aboriginal right to fish cannot exist apart from Aboriginal title to the
land where the fishing takes place. The Court answered this question in
each case by deciding that an Aboriginal right to fish can exist as a free-
standing right independently of Aboriginal title, as that title is just one sub-
set of the larger category of Aboriginal rights. In so doing, Lamer C.J., who
delivered the principal judgment in each case, relied on the Van der Peet
test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights. In Adams, he said:
What this test, along with the conceptual basis which underlies it, indicates, is
that while claims to aboriginal title fall within the conceptual framework of
aboriginal rights, aboriginal rights do not exist solely where a claim to aborigi-
INDIGENOUS LAw REPORTER 18 (1997); Kelly Gallagher-Mackay, Interpreting Self-
Government: Approaches to Building Cultural Authority [1997] 4 CANADIAN NATIVE LAW
REPORTER 1; Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, The Supreme Court's
Van der Peet Trilogy: NaYve Imperialism and Ropes of Sand, 42 McGILL LAW JOURNAL 993
(1997).
76. See generally CASSIDY, supra note 33, especially Robin Ridington, Fieldwork in Court-
room 53: A Witness to Delgamuukw 206, and Michael Asch, Errors in Delgamuukw- An An-
thropological Perspective 221 (commenting on lack of cross-cultural understanding by the tial
judge in the Delgamuukw case).
77. For an Aboriginal perspective on this, see Borrows, supra note 75.
78. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
79. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
80. For more detailed discussion, see Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights, supra note 75.
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nal title has been made out. Where an aboriginal group has shown that a par-
ticular practice, custom or tradition taking place on the land was integral to the
distinctive culture of that group then, even if they have not shown that their oc-
cupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title to the
land, they will have demonstrated that they have an aboriginal right to engage
in that practice, custom or tradition. The Van der Peet test protects activities
which were integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming
the right; it does not require that that group satisfy the further hurdle of demon-
strating that their connection with the piece of land on which the activity was
taking place was of a central significance to their distinctive culture sufficient
to make out a claim to Aboriginal title to the land.
8 1
In Adams and C6td the Supreme Court therefore clarified an issue that
had been left unclear in the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in
Delgamuukw, namely whether specific Aboriginal rights such as a right to
fish amount to a form of Aboriginal title.8 2 The Adams and Ct6 decisions
reveal that they do not, as those rights can exist on their own, independ-
ently of Aboriginal title. From those decisions, it appears that a free-
standing Aboriginal right to fish and Aboriginal title to land are conceptu-
ally different: the former involves a right to pursue an activity on the land,
whereas the latter involves a right to the land itself In the case of a claim to
a free-standing right such as a fishing right, the Van der Peet test applies to
determine whether the right is supported by a practice, custom or tradition
that was integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal society prior to
contact with Europeans. However, the relevance of that test to a claim to
Aboriginal title was left uncertain by the Adams and COt decisions.
We can now return to the Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw,
where the issue of the application of the Van der Peet test to an Aboriginal
title claim was dealt with directly by Chief Justice Lamer. He began his
discussion of Aboriginal title by addressing the long-lasting controversy
over its content, a controversy revealed in the opposing positions of the
parties:
The appellants [representing the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples] argue that
aboriginal title is tantamount to an inalienable fee simple, which confers on
aboriginal peoples the rights to use those lands as they choose and which has
81. R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 117-18 (Lamer CJ.'s emphasis). See also R. v. C6t6
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 166-67.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 45-46.
83. For discussion, see Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights, supra note 75 (arguing that
the Van der Peet test, if applied to Aboriginal tifle, should only be used to determine the exis-
tence of that title, and then only with modifications; it should not be used to determine the con-
tent of the title, as that would be inconsistent with Aboriginal perspectives, violate common law
principles and precedents, and be discriminatory).
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been constitutionalized by s. 35(1). The respondents [the governments of Brit-
ish Columbia and Canada] offer two alternative formulations: fn-st, that abo-
riginal title is no more than a bundle of rights to engage in activities which are
themselves aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), and that the
Constitution Act, 1982, merely constitutionalizes those individual rights, not
the bundle itself, because the latter has no independent content; and second,
that aboriginal title, at most, encompasses the right to exclusive use and occu-
pation of land in order to engage in those activities which are aboriginal rights
themselves, and that s.35(l) constitutionalizes this notion of exclusivity.
8 4
Lamer C.J. rejected both these arguments, and held that "[tihe content of
aboriginal title, in fact, lies somewhere in between these positions."' '
Lamer C.J. relied on his decision in Adams to reject the respondents'
argument that Aboriginal title is simply a collection of free-standing Abo-
riginal rights, with no independent content. In this regard, he said that,
"although aboriginal title is a species of aboriginal right recognized and
affirmed by s.35(l), it is distinct from other aboriginal rights because it
arises where the connection of a group with a piece of land 'was of a cen-
tral significance to their distinctive culture."'8 6 He did not, however, apply
the Van der Peet test to determine the content of Aboriginal title. He stated:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage
in specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights. Rather, it con-
fers the right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be as-
pects of practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinctive
cultures of aboriginal societies.
Relying on Adams, Lamer C.J. viewed Aboriginal rights as lying
along a spectrum, their location thereon being dependent on degree of con-
nection with the land. At one end are free-standing Aboriginal rights which
are aspects of practices, customs and traditions integral to the group's dis-
tinctive culture, but which are not connected with any particular land. In
the middle are site-specific Aboriginal rights which are related to particular
land but do not involve a sufficient connection to support title; they also
need to meet the integral to the distinctive culture test laid down in Van der
Peet. Finally,
[a]t the other end of the spectrum, there is aboriginal title itself. As Adams
makes clear, aboriginal title confers more than the right to engage in site-
specific activities which are aspects of the practices, customs and traditions of
84. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 240.
85. Id.
86. Id. at251 (quoting R. v. Adams [1997] 3 S.C.R. 101, 117-118).
57. Id. at 240-41.
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distinctive aboriginal cultures. Site-specific rights can be made out even if title
cannot. What aboriginal title confers is the right to the land itself.
8 8
Lamer C.J. found support for his position "that the uses to which lands
held pursuant to aboriginal title can be put [are] not restricted to the prac-
tices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples integral to distinctive
aboriginal cultures"' 9 in Canadian case law, especially Guerin v. The
Queen, wtere Dickson J. held that the Indian interest in Aboriginal title
land and relerve land is the same.90 As the Indian interest in reserves is not
restricted to traditional uses, entailing instead a broad right to use the lands
for a variety of purposes in accordance with the present-day needs of re-
serve communities, Aboriginal title must be just as extensive.9' Moreover,
case and statute law indicate that the Indian interest in reserves includes
subsurface as well as surface rights, so Aboriginal title does as well, en-
compassing mineral rights and oil and gas exploitation, even if these were
not traditional uses of the lands.92
However, as mentioned earlier, Lamer C.J. also rejected the appel-
88. Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 243-44.
90. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335,379.
91. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 244-45. For more
detailed discussion, see McNeil, supra note 37, at 148-51.
92. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 245, relying especially
on Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment) [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 (holding the federal government liable for breach of its fiduciary
duty in relation to surrender of mineral rights on a reserve), and the Indian Oil and Gas Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-7, s.6(2) (providing that nothing in that Act precludes Indian people from
negotiating for oil and gas benefits in areas where their Aboriginal land claims have not been
settled). Though Lamer CJ. did not refer to American law in this context, this aspect of his
decision is fully supported by decisions in the United States, where the courts have held that, in
valuing Indian land for the purpose of paying compensation, it makes no difference whether the
land is held by original Indian title, or is land specifically reserved by treaty or otherwise; in
both cases, the value of the land is the same as it would be if the Indians held the fee simple,
and includes the value of both surface and subsurface resources: see United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 115-18 (1938); United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S.
119, 122-123 (1938); Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 942
(1959); United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F. 2d 786, 796 (1968). In Otoe and Mis-
souria Tribe v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (1955), certiorari denied 350 U.S. 848 (1955),
Littleton J. for the Court of Claims, at 290-1, expressly rejected the argument that the land be
valued in accordance with the use the Indians made of it instead, appropriate factors to be
considered were "the natural resources of the land ceded, including its climate, vegetation,
including timber, game and wildlife, mineral resources and whether they are of economic value
at the time of cession, or merely of potential value, water power, its then or potential use, mar-
kets and transportation - considering the ready markets at that time and the potential market." In
rejecting "the 'subsistence' approach advocated by the Government", he said: "Values cannot
be determined on the basis of berries and wild fruits." See also United States ex rel. Chunie v.
Ringrose, 788 F. 2d 638, 642 (1986), where Fletcher J. for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
wrote: "Aboriginal title entitles the tribes to full use and enjoyment of the surface and mineral
estate, and to resources, such as timber, on the land."
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lants' argument that "aboriginal title is tantamount to an inalienable fee
simple."'93 He affirmed the description of Aboriginal title in earlier cases as
a sui generis interest in land,94 and placed a limitation on it, stemming from
the second branch of what he regarded as its dual source. He said that:
aboriginal title arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peo-
ples. That prior occupation is relevant in two different ways: first, because of
the physical fact of occupation, and second, because aboriginal title originates
in part from pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. However, the law of abo-
riginal title does not only seek to determine the historic rights of aboriginal
peoples to land; it also seeks to afford legal protection to prior occupation in
the present-day. Implicit in the protection of historic patterns of occupation is a
recognition of the importance of the continuity of the relationship of an abo-
riginal community to its land over time.
95
Later in his judgment, Lamer C.J. said that "the source of aboriginal title
appears to be grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal per-
spective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems of
law."96 In the common law, occupation of land is proof of possession in
law, giving rise to a legal estate.97 However, one of the reasons why Abo-
riginal title is "sui generis is that it arises from possession before the asser-
tion of British sovereignty, whereas normal estates, like fee simple, arise
afterward."98 Apparently this is also a reason why Aboriginal title is not
tantamount to an inalienable fee simple.'
Lamer C.J. found a connection between the second branch of the
source of Aboriginal title, that is, Aboriginal perspectives, including Abo-
riginal systems of law, and the need to maintain an Aboriginal commu-
nity's relationship with the land. In his view, this places an inherent limita-
tion on Aboriginal title that prevents the lands from being "put to such uses
as may be irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and
93. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 240; see supra text ac-
companying notes 84-85.
94. Id. at 241-42, 246, 248. See also Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 382; Cana-
dian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654, 678; Roberts v. Canada [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, 337;
Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119, 138-40; St. Mary's Indian Band v.
Cranbook (City) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657,666-68.
95. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,246-47.
96. Id. at 255.
97. Id. at 242. See generally MCNEIL, supra note 30.
98. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R. 4th 193, 242 (Lamer CJ.'s
emphasis), Other features of Aboriginal title identified by Lamer CJ. that make it sui generis
are its inalienability other than by surrender to the Crown, and its communal nature: id. at 241-
42. For possible exceptions to the general rule that fee simple estates arise after assertion of
British sovereignty, see discussion of land titles in British Honduras (now Belize) and Pitcairn
Island in MCNEIL, supra note 30, at 141-60.
99. Compare the American cases cited supra note 92.
1998]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
the relationship that the particular group has had with the land which to-
gether have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place."' ° One of his
concerns appears to be with the preservation of Aboriginal cultures, which
might be undermined if Aboriginal lands are used in ways that do not re-
spect Aboriginal peoples' special relationships with the land.'0 ' But he was
careful to point out that this does not mean that Aboriginal title is limited to
historic uses. He said that the limitation
arises from the particular physical and cultural relationship that a group may
have with the land and is defined by the source of aboriginal title over it. This
is not, I must emphasize, a limitation that restricts the use of the land to those
activities that have traditionally been carried out on it. That would amount to a
legal strait-jacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to
the land. The approach'I have outlined above allows for a full range of uses of
the land, subject only to an overarching limit, defined by the special nature of
the aboriginal title in that land.
102
Therefore the limitation is a culturally-based internal limitation that
can vary from one Aboriginal group to another,"3 and perhaps from one
parcel of land to another under the same Aboriginal title. This interpreta-
tion is supported by Lamer C.J.'s examples. If Aboriginal title arises from
occupation [that] is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunt-
ing ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land
may not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by
strip-mining it). Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land be-
cause of its ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such
a way as to destroy that relationship (e.g., by developing it in such a way that
the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).
104
This raises the question, which Lamer C.J. did not answer, of whether an
Aboriginal community, by altering its culture and hence its uses of the
land, can modify the inherent limitation on its title. In the first example
100. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R. 4th 193,247.
101. Id., where Lamer CJ. stated that an Aboriginal community's relationship with its land
"should not be prevented from continuing into the future. As a result, uses of the lands that
would threaten that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of
aboriginal title."
102. Id. at 249.
103. See also id. at 247, where Lamer CJ. said that, if the occupancy necessary to establish
Aboriginal title has been proven "by reference to the activities that have taken place on the land
and the uses to which the land has been put by the particular group..., there will exist a special
bond between the group and the land in question such that the land will be part of the definition
of the group's distinctive culture" (emphasis added).
104. Id.
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given above, what would be the result if the Aboriginal society changed so
that hunting ceased to be culturally significant, and then decided to strip-
mine lands that were formerly used for hunting? Is there any reason why
the limitation that would have existed while the lands were hunting
grounds should continue to apply? To maintain the limitation in those cir-
cumstances would seem to impose the kind of "legal strait-jacket" that
Lamer C.J. was at pains to avoid.0 5 This problem relates to a larger issue
that he avoided as well, namely that of self-government, which we will
come back to in Parts 2 and 3 of this article.
On the other hand, the inherent limitation may not be as great a barrier
to changes in Aboriginal use as the above examples suggest. While cau-
tioning against the application of "traditional real property rules" to Abo-
riginal title, Lamer C.J. suggested that
a useful analogy can be drawn between the limit on aboriginal title and the
concept of equitable waste at common law. Under that doctrine, persons who
hold a life estate in real property cannot commit "wanton or extravagant acts of
destruction" ... or "ruin the property".... This description of the limits imposed
by the doctrine of equitable waste capture the kind of limit I have in mind
here. 1
This waste analogy is in keeping with the communal nature of Aboriginal
title and a common Aboriginal perspective that land does not belong just to
the living members of the community, but to future generations as well.'07
There is thus an obligation to maintain the land, which may in fact prevent
it from being used for strip-mining or clear-cutting. However, this would
not prevent Aboriginal communities from engaging in mining and forestry
on their lands in more environmentally respectful ways that do preserve the
lands for future use and enjoyment.
After dealing with the issue of content of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J.
turned to the matter of proof. He laid down three criteria that must be satis-
fied to make out a claim to Aboriginal title:
(i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present oc-
cupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a
105. See id. at 258, where Lamer C.J. said that a change in the nature of occupation
"would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial
connection between the people and the land is maintained. The only limitation on this
principle might be the internal limits on uses which land that is subject to aboriginal
title may be put, i.e., uses which are inconsistent with continued use by future gen-
erations of aboriginals."
106. Id. at 248.
107. See, e.g., Leroy Little Bear, Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian "Grundnonn", in J.
RICK PONTING, ed., ARDUOUS JOURNEY: CANADIAN INDIANS AND DECOLONIZATION 243, 245
(1986).
1998]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sover-
eignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.1
08
These criteria involve two significant modifications of the Van der
Peet test where Aboriginal title is concerned. First, "the requirement that
the land be integral to the distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed
by the requirement of occupancy."' In other words, it is not necessary for
the claimants to prove that their connection with the land is integral to their
distinctive culture, as proof of occupation suffices to establish that connec-
tion. Lamer C.J. put it this way:
in the case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was occupied
pre-sovereignty, and which the parties have maintained a substantial connec-
tion with since then, is sufficiently important to be of central significance to the
culture of the claimants. As a result, I do not think it is necessary to include ex-
plicitly this element as part of the test for aboriginal title.
0I t
On what amounts to occupation, Lamer C.J. indicated that the dual
source of Aboriginal title requires that both the common law and Aborigi-
nal perspectives be taken into account. From the common law perspective,
physical presence on and use of land is proof of occupation. He elaborated:
Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular
use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its re-
sources.... In considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is estab-
lished, "one must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material
resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands
claimed.""'
From the Aboriginal perspective, their own practices, customs and tradi-
tions, including but not limited to their laws, can also be relied upon to es-
tablish occupation:
108. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 253.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 257.
111. Id. at 256, quoting Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CANADIAN BAR
RVIEW 727, 758 (1987). Similarly, in evaluating Indian occupation in Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835), Baldwin J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said
that it "was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds
were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites." See also United
States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1941); Northwestern Shoshone Indi-
ans v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 338-40 (1945); Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 383
F.2d 991, 998 (1967); United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 383-86 (1967).
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As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in re-
lation to land, those laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of
lands which are the subject of a claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might
include, but are not limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land
112
use.
The second modification to the Van der Peet test in this context in-
volves the time frame for proof of Aboriginal title. It will be recalled that
for other Aboriginal rights the time for applying the integral to the distinc-
tive culture test is the time prior to European contact' 13 Lamer C.J. pointed
out that this time frame is inappropriate where Aboriginal title is con-
cerned. Instead, he chose assertion of Crown sovereignty as the relevant
date because "aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title,"
and
the Crown did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty over the land in
question. Because it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the underly-
ing title before that title existed, aboriginal title crystallized at the time sover-
eignty was asserted."
4
Lamer C.J. supported the Crown sovereignty time frame with two ad-
ditional reasons. The first relates to his conclusion that the integral to the
distinctive culture test for Aboriginal rights is subsumed by the require-
ment of occupancy for Aboriginal title. In his words,
aboriginal title does not raise the problem of distinguishing between distinctive,
integral aboriginal practices, customs and traditions and those influenced or in-
troduced by European contact. Under common law, the act of occupation or
possession is sufficient to ground aboriginal title and it is not necessary to
prove that the land was a distinctive or integral part of the aboriginal society
before the arrival of Europeans.
115
The second reason is that,
from a practical standpoint, it appears that the date of sovereignty is more cer-
tain than the date of first contact. It is often very difficult to determine the pre-
cise moment that each aboriginal group had first contact with European
culture."
6
112. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 256.
113. See supra text accompanying note 55.
114. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 254; see also Aboriginal
Title and Aboriginal Rights, supra note 75, at 128-34.
115. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,254.
116. Id.
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However, while the trial judge in Delgamuukw had found, "and the parties
did not dispute on appeal; that British sovereignty over British Columbia
was conclusively established by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846","'
the date of Crown sovereignty is not so clear in some parts of Canada.
Also, there is a difference between assertion and actual acquisition of sov-
ereignty, though Lamer C.J. did not make that distinction. But by accepting
1846 as the date when sovereignty was "conclusively established" in Brit-
ish Columbia, he ignored earlier assertions of British sovereignty. In any
case, as the Crown would not have acquired underlying title to land prior to
actually acquiring sovereignty, the relevant date must be acquisition of
sovereignty. Lamer C.J. may have though it unnecessary to be more pre-
cise about this because he probably assumed that assertion and acquisition
of sovereignty occur simultaneously."I8 However, this is not necessarily so,
as the example of British Columbia itself demonstrates." 9
Lamer C.J.'s Crown sovereignty time frame for proof of Aboriginal
title leaves another important question unanswered as well. Large areas of
Canada, especially in the Maritime provinces and southern Quebec and
Ontario, were formerly French colonies." As the claim in Delgamuukw
related only to British Columbia, Lamer C.J. did not have to consider the
date for proof of Aboriginal title in former French Canada. He nonetheless
framed the principles for proof of that title in general terms, without limit-
ing them to British Columbia or expressly excluding the parts of Canada
that Britain had acquired from France. So are his references to assertion of
sovereignty by the "Crown" limited to the British Crown, or should they be
interpreted to include the French sovereign as well? In other words, in for-
mer French Canada is the date for the proof of occupation of land for Abo-
117. Id. at 254-55.
118. A number of English cases have decided that the effectiveness of an assertion of sover-
eignty by the Crown cannot be questioned by the courts: see The Fagemes [1927] P. 311
(C.A.); R. v. Kent Justices [1967] 1 All E.R. 560 (Q.B.); Post Office v. Estuary Radio [1968] 2
Q.B. 740 (C.A.); Adams v. Adams [1970] 3 All E.R. 572 (P.D.A.). However, the applicability
of these decisions in the context of acquisition of Crown sovereignty in Canada is questionable.
See the Ontario Boundaries Case (1884, P.C.) in PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ... PRIVY COUNCIL
... RESPECTING THE WESTERLY BOUNDARY OF ONTARIO (1889), as discussed in KENT MCNEIL,
NATIVE RIGHTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF RUPERT'S LAND AND THE NORTH-WESTERN
TERRITORY 26-33 (1982). For further critical commentary on this judicial deference to the
executive, see works cited infra note 119.
119. For further discussion of this issue in relation to Crown sovereignty over Rupert's Land,
which became part of Canada in 1870, see Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's
Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It Didn't Have, in DANIEL DRACHE AND ROBERTO
PERIN, eds., NEGOTIATING WITH A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC 107 (1992); Mei Lin Ng, Convenient
Illusions: A Consideration of Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Right of Self-Government 2-69
(1994) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, York University, Osgoode Hall Law School).
120. On the extent of New France prior to its cession to Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1763,
see MCNEIL, supra note 118.
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riginal title the date of British or French acquisition of sovereignty?
This complex question cannot be adequately addressed here. However,
it is worth noting that in Adams and CMrd Lamer C.J. held that, even if
French law did not acknowledge Aboriginal rights in French Canada, the
existence of those rights should be determined on the same basis as in the
rest of Canada. In CS, he said:
I do not believe that the intervention of French sovereignty negated the poten-
tial existence of aboriginal rights within the former boundaries of New France
under s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The entrenchment of aboriginal an-
cestral and treaty rights in s.35(1) has changed the landscape of aboriginal
rights in Canada....
Section 35(l) would fail to achieve its noble purpose of preserving the in-
tegral and defining features of distinctive aboriginal societies if it only pro-
tected those defining features which were fortunate enough to have received the
legal recognition and protection of European colonizers....
The respondent's view [that there are no aboriginal rights in what was
formerly French Canada], if adopted, would create an awkward patchwork of
constitutional protection for aboriginal rights across the nation, depending upon
the historical idiosyncracies of colonization over particular regions of the
country. In my respectful view, such a static and retrospective interpretation of
s.35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble and prospective purpose of the con-
stitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act,
1982.121
However, in both Adams and CMt6, Lamer C.J. applied the Van der Peet
test to determine whether fishing had been integral to the distinctive cul-
tures of the Aboriginal groups in question at the time of contact with the
French. If the Supreme Court takes a similar approach to an Aboriginal
title claim in former French Canada, then the time for proof of occupation
will likely be the date of acquisition of French rather than British sover-
eignty.'2m On the other hand, in this context Lamer C.J. said in Delga-
muukw that "aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the land by
aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.' 'lt 3 As the common law would not
have applied before British acquisition of sovereignty at the earliest,'24 and
121. R. v. C6t6 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 174-75.
122. As with British sovereignty in other parts of Canada, the time when this occurred is by
no means certain: see Brian Slattery, Did France Claim Canada Upon "'Discovery"?, in J.M.
BUMSTEAD, ed., INTERPRETING CANADA'S PAST, vol. I, BEFORE CONFEDERATION 2 (1986).
123. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 254 (emphasis added).
124. As Britain acquired French Canada by conquest and cession, by the rules of Imperial
colonial law the common law generally would not have been received upon acquisition of
British sovereignty, but would have had to be introduced. See Blankard v. Galdy (1693) Holt
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French law may not have accorded title on the basis of occupation,"2 it
may be more appropriate to use acquisition of British sovereignty, or even
introduction of the common law, as the relevant time. 6
With respect to the second requirement for proof of Aboriginal title,
namely, continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, Lamer
C.J. was careful not to impose an unrealistic standard. He said that
"[c]onclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation may be difficult to
come by. Instead, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of pres-
ent occupation as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation in support of a claim
to aboriginal title."' 27 Moreover, proof of "an unbroken chain of continu-
ity' ' 2 is not necessary:
The occupation and use of lands may have been disrupted for a time, perhaps as
a result of the unwillingness of European colonizers to recognize aboriginal ti-
tle. To impose the requirement of continuity too strictly would risk "under-
mining the very purposes of s.35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suf-
fered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect"
aboriginal rights to land.
129
On the third requirement of exclusivity of occupation, Lamer C.J. re-
lated it to the nature of Aboriginal title, which he described as "the right to
exclusive use and occupation of land.', 30 For there to be an exclusive right
he said there must be proof of exclusive occupation:
Were it possible to prove title without demonstrating exclusive occupation, the
result would be absurd, because it would be possible for more than one abo-
riginal nation to have aboriginal title over the same piece of land, and then for
all of them to attempt to assert the right to exclusive use and occupation over
i 131
K.B. 341 (K.B.); Privy Council Memorandum (1722) 2 P. Wins. 75 (P.C.); Campbell v. Hall
(1774) Lofft 655 (K.B.); Donegani v. Donegani (1835) 3 Knapp 63, 85 (P.C.). This was pur-
portedly done by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but French law was re-introduced in civil
matters by the Quebec Act, 14 Geo. 111 (1774), c.83.
125. The issue of whether Aboriginal title could exist under the French regime was left unre-
solved in Adams and COtj.
126. Note, however, that in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 250,
Lamer C.J. used the middle portion of the above-quoted passage from COrd to conclude that
"the existence of a particular aboriginal right at common law is not a sine qua non for the proof
of an aboriginal right that is recognized and affirmed by s.35(l).... The existence of an aborigi-
nal right at common law is therefore sufficient, but not necessary, for the recognition and af-
firmation of that right by s.35(l)."
127. Id. at 257.
128. Id. (quoting R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 557).
129. Id. (quoting R. v. Cdt6 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 175).
130. Id. at 258 (Lamer C.J.'s emphasis).
131. Id.
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Proof of exclusivity, like proof of occupation, must take account of, and
place equal weight on, common law and Aboriginal perspectives:
as the common law concept of possession must be sensitive to the realities of
aboriginal society, so must the concept of exclusivity. Exclusivity is a common
law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be
imported into the concept of aboriginal title with caution. As such, the test re-
quired to establish exclusive occupation must take into account the context of
the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty.132
Moreover, exclusivity may be shown by proof of Aboriginal law, such as
laws against trespass so that "the presence of trespassers does not count as
evidence against exclusivity.' 3 Another example Lamer C.J. gave was of
Aboriginal laws or treaties that granted permission to other Aboriginal
groups to use or reside temporarily on the claimed land, as that would re-
veal intention and capacity to control the land.
34
Finally, Lamer C.J. said that exclusivity does not exclude the possibil-
ity of joint Aboriginal title, held by more than one Aboriginal group who
shared exclusive occupation. This concept of shared exclusivity, which is
"well-known to the common law", would apply in a situation, for example,
where, "two aboriginal nations lived on a particular piece of land and rec-
ognized each other's entitlement to that land but nobody else's.'
' 31
While Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Delgamuukw did not resolve all the
outstanding issues in relation to Aboriginal title, it did go a long way to-
ward clarifying the content of that title, and specifying how it can be
proved. Aboriginal title is a right of exclusive use and occupation of the
land, for a broad variety of purposes which are not restricted to traditional
and historic uses, but subject to the inherent limitation that the lands cannot
be used in ways that are inconsistent with use and enjoyment by future
generations. Aboriginal title can be established by proving exclusive occu-
pation of lands at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty, by evidence of
physical presence and use, and Aboriginal practices, customs and tradi-
tions, including laws, that reveal that the lands were exclusively occupied.
Other significant matters dealt with in the judgment, which will only be
touched on briefly in the next Part of this article, are federal and provincial
132. Id.
133. Id. at 259
134. Id.
135. Id. Lamer C.J. supported this conclusion with United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Rail-
road, 314 U.S. 339 (1941), the only American case cited in his judgment. See also Turtle
Mountain Band v. United States, 490 F. 2d 935, 944 (1974); United States v. Pueblo of San
Ildefonso, 513 F. 2d 1383, 1394-95 (1975); Strong v. United States, 518 F. 2d 556, 561-62
(1975), certiorari denied 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
1998] 277
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
powers over Aboriginal title, including the test for justification of legisla-
tive infringements of it. But as mentioned earlier, the vital issue of self-
government, which was dealt with by the lower courts, was sent back to
trial without any explicit directions from the Supreme Court. However, we
will see in the next Part that there is some indication in Chief Justice
Lamer's judgment that the Court may be willing to accept a properly-
framed self-government claim.
II. THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
While the question of whether the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have
an inherent right of self-government has not been addressed directly by the
Supreme Court of Canada, 36 lower courts have generally adopted a nega-
tive position when faced with the issue. For example, in Attorney-General
for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, Steele J. of the Ontario Supreme
Court said this:
Although it was the custom in Canada not to interfere with the internal affairs
of a local band or to extinguish aboriginal rights except by treaties, there was
no legal right of internal administration or self-government by the local band....
Hence, the Indian nations or bands were not sovereign and their aboriginal
rights could be extinguished unilaterally by validly enacted legislation or trea-
ties.
137
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, McEachern C.J. delivered a par-
ticularly negative judgment at trial on the claim by the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en to ownership of and jurisdiction over their territories. Re-
garding jurisdiction, which was the claimants' way of referring to their
right of self-government, he said:
It is my conclusion that Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en laws and customs are not
136. For arguments in favor of such a right, see ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES, PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATON: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND THE
CONSTrTUiON (1993) [hereinafter PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATION]; Kent McNeil, Envisaging
Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments, 19 QUEEN'S LAW JOURNAL 95 [hereinafter
Envisaging Constitutional Space]. For a history of political efforts to achieve recognition of this
right, see Kent McNeil, The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of Abo-
riginal Governments, 7 WESTERN LEGAL HISTORY 113 (1994); see also Ng, supra note 119;
BRUCE CLARK, NATIVE LIBERTY, CROWN SOVEREIGNTY: THE EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGIrr OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA (1990).
137. (1984) 15 D.L.R.4th 321, 407, where Steele J. added the qualification that "[t]here may
be some question as to Canada's unilateral power (to extinguish aboriginal rights] now in view
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982." His decision was affirmed on appeal, without
reference to self-government (1989) 58 D.L.R.4th 117 (Ont. C.A.); [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570. See
also Logan v. Styres (1959) 20 D.L.R.2d 416 (Ont. H.C.).
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sufficiently certain to permit a finding that they or their ancestors governed the
territory according to aboriginal laws even though some Indians may well have
chosen to follow local customs when it was convenient to do so. 
3 8
Moreover, even if the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en were self-governing prior
to European colonization, McEachem C.J. held that "the aboriginal system,
to the extent it constituted aboriginal jurisdiction of [sic] sovereignty, ...
gave way to a new colonial form of government which the law recognizes
to the exclusion of all other systems."'' 9 And if that was not enough to dis-
pose of the claim, he went on to add that, at the moment the colony of
British Columbia joined Canada in 1871, "all legislative jurisdiction was
divided between Canada and the province and there was no room for abo-
riginal jurisdiction or sovereignty which would be recognized by the law or
the courts."'
14
McEachem C.J.'s conclusions regarding Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
laws and customs, along with other aspects of his decision, have been se-
verely criticized for their ethnocentric bias.14 ' While avoiding the more
objectional features of his judgment, the majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld his decision that any right of self-
government the Aboriginal peoples of British Columbia may have had was
extinguished by 1871 at the latest.' 42 Macfarlane and Wallace JJ.A. both
were of the opinion that the Constitution Act, 1867, 4' which applied to
British Columbia when it joined Confederation in 1871, exhaustively dis-
tributed legislative powers between the federal and provincial govern-
ments, leaving no space for Aboriginal jurisdiction.'"M Macfarlane J.A.
stated-
With respect, I think that the trial judge was correct in his view that when the
Crown imposed English law on all the inhabitants of the colony and, in par-
ticular, when British Columbia entered Confederation, the Indians became
subject to the legislative authorities in Canada and their laws. In 1871, two lev-
els of government were established in British Columbia. The division of gov-
ernmental powers between Canada and the provinces left no room for a third
order of government.1
45
138. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991) 79 D.L.R.4th 185, 449.
139. Id. at 453.
140. Id.
141. See CASSIDY, supra note 33; Ridington, supra note 76; Asch, supra note 76.
142. See generally Bob Freedman, The Space for Aboriginal Self-Government in British Co-
lumbia: The Effect of the Decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, 28 UNIvERsrrY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 49 (1994).
143. 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c.3.
144. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470, per Macfarlane J.A. at
519-20, Wallace J.A. at 591-93.
145. Id. at 520.
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Lambert and Hutcheon JJ.A. dissented on this issue. Lambert J.A. did
not regard the self-government claim of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en as a
claim to exercise exclusive or paramount legislative power within their
territories, and so he found no inconsistency between the division of pow-
ers in the Constitution Act, 1867, and an Aboriginal right of self-
government"'6 He thought that that right, which may have been diminished
by acquisition of British sovereignty and introduction of the common law,
continued before and after Confederation, and received constitutional pro-
tection as an Aboriginal right under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.147
In his dissent on this issue, Hutcheon J.A. relied on the fact that, prior
to 1880s, there had been no attempt to impose English or Canadian law on
the Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en. Moreover, attempts to do so from then on
were generally unsuccessful in suppressing the Feast, which continues to
be the principal means through which governmental authority is exercised
by those peoples.'4 Hutcheon J.A. concluded that, while the right of self-
government (or self-regulation, as he preferred to call it) has been affected
by federal and provincial legislation, it has never been clearly and plainly
extinguished, and so is now protected by section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.14'
Macfarlane and Wallace JJ.A. have been criticized for their failure to
apply the "clear and plain" test for extinguishment of Aboriginal rights
before concluding that no Aboriginal right of self-government survived
British Columbia's entry into Canada, especially when they endorsed and
applied that test in the context of Aboriginal land rights, as they were com-
pelled by precedent to do.'50 It has also been pointed out by the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples that the approach taken by Macfarlane
and Wallace JJ.A. "confuses the question of the scope of federal and pro-
vincial powers with the question of the exclusiveness of those powers."''
The Commission argued convincingly that distribution of governmental
powers by the Constitution Act, 1867, did not extinguish Aboriginal rights
of self-government, as that distribution, even if comprehensive, would
have left room for Aboriginal governments to exercise concurrent
powers.'52 To this can be added the argument, to be developed in more de-
146. Id. at 727.
147. Id. at 728-30.
148. See Address of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs to Chief Justice
McEachern of the Supreme Court of British Columbia [1988] 1 CANADIAN NATIVE LAW
REPORTER 17 [hereinafterAddress of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en].
149. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470,762-64.
150. See Bruce Ryder, Aboriginal Rights and Delgamuukw v. The Queen, 5:2
CONSTTUTIONAL FORuM 43, 45-46 (1994). For the relevant precedents, see supra note 34.
151. PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATION, supra note 136, at 32 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 32-36. The Commission supported this argument by pointing out that in 1867 fed-
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tail below, that the communal nature of Aboriginal rights necessitates a
right of self-government to distribute and regulate those rights within the
community.
While the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet ruled on the existence
of an Aboriginal right of self-government, it was willing to assume that
such a right can exist in its recent decision in R. v. Pamajewon.153 That case
involved a claim by two Ojibwa groups in Ontario, the Shawanaga and
Eagle Lake First Nations, that they have an inherent tight of self-
government, which includes a right to regulate gambling activities on their
reserves. They argued that they are therefore exempt from federal laws
relating to gambling, as their right of self-government is constitutionally
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Lamer C.J., whose judgment was concurred in by the rest of the Court
except L'Heureux-Dub J. (she delivered a short judgment of her own,
concurring in result), started by "[a]ssuming without deciding that s.35(l)
includes self-government claims.' 5 4 In so far as they are included under
that section, he said that those claims "are no different from other claims to
the enjoyment of aboriginal rights and must, as such, be measured against
the same standard."'' 5 That standard is the Van der Peet test."'56
The first element of the Van der Peet test is identification of the right
claimed. The appellants in Pamajewon wanted the Court to "characterize
their claim as to 'a broad right to manage the use of their reserve lands"'. 1
57
Lamer C.J. rejected this characterization, as it would
cast the Court's inquiry at a level of excessive generality. Aboriginal rights, in-
cluding any asserted right to self-government, must be looked at in light of the
specific circumstances of each case and, in particular, in light of the specific
history and culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right.'
eral and provincial legislative powers were not in fact exclusive, as the British Parliament re-
tained general legislative authority over Canada until enactment of the Statute of Westminster,
1931, 22 Geo. V (U.K.), c.4. Moreover, the Canadian Parliament acknowledged in legislation
that Indian tribes had some authority that could be exercised "according to their rules": An Act
providing for the organisation of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for
the management of Indian and Ordinance Lands, S.C. 1868, c.42, s.8. The Commission's posi-
tion is also consistent with American law, which has acknowledged the continuing sovereignty
of the Indian tribes, while according Congress concurrent jurisdiction over them: see COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 217-20, 229-41.
153. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821. For commentary, see Bradford W. Morse, Permafrost Rights: Abo-
riginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon, 42 MCGILL LAW
JouRNAL 1011 (1997).
154. R.v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821,832.
155. Id. at 832-33.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
157. R.v. Pamajewon [1996]2 S.C.R. 821,834.
158. Id. See also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,266.
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He accordingly characterized their claim as a claim to "the right to partici-
pate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the
reservation."' 59 If applied to all self-government claims, this narrow ap-
proach to identification of the claimed right will effectively close the door
to broadly-based Aboriginal jurisdiction over a range of activities in a
modem-day context. Inherent self-government rights, even if accepted by
the Court, will have to be established on an item-by-item basis, in accor-
dance with the claimant group's specific history and culture.
The effect of this narrow approach is revealed by Lamer C.J.'s appli-
cation in Pamajewon of the second element of the Van der Peet test, by
which it must be determined whether or not the activity in question was
integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal people claiming the
right. Looking at the evidence, he found that, while it demonstrated that the
Ojibwa gambled prior to European contact, it did not show that gambling
was of central significance to them. Moreover, the evidence did not reveal
that gambling was regulated by the Ojibwa historically. Also, gambling
was informal and small-scale; it was not the sort of large-scale activity the
appellants were claiming a right to engage in and regulate. Lamer C.J. ex-
pressly agreed with the observation of Flaherty Prov. CL J. at trial that
commercial lotteries such as bingo are a twentieth century phenomena and
nothing of the kind existed amongst aboriginal peoples and was never part of
the means by which those societies were traditionally sustained or socialized.1
60
Lamer C.J. therefore concluded that the appellants had failed to meet the
Van der Peet test by proving that participation in and regulation of high-
stakes gambling were integral to their distinctive culture prior to European
contact.
The Pamajewon decision shows not only how restrictive the Supreme
Court's approach is to the identification of Aboriginal rights (apart from
Aboriginal title), but also the degree of continuity that must be shown be-
tween pre-contact and present-day practices, customs and traditions. It is
not enough for an Aboriginal people to have gambled - it appears that they
must have engaged in gambling activities of the sort or on the scale of the
gambling they claim to have a right to participate in. Moreover, there is a
distinction here between an Aboriginal right to gamble, and a right of self-
government in relation to gambling. To have the former, an Aboriginal
people must have engaged in similar gambling historically, but to have the
latter apparently they must go further and prove as well that they regulated
that gambling. The hurdles and pit-falls confronting an Aboriginal people
159. R. v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, 833. Compare per L'Heureux-Dub6 J. at 837-38,
where she disagmed with Lamer C.J. and characterized the claim as "an existing Aboriginal
right to gamble" (her emphasis).
160. Quoted id. at 835.
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who want to establish even a very limited right of self-government over a
specific activity therefore appear to be formidable.
I nonetheless think the Pamajewon decision is distinguishable where a
claim is made to a right of self-government over Aboriginal lands and re-
sources. It was argued in the Ontario Court of Appeal in that case that "the
right to self-government existed either as an incident to aboriginal title in
the reserve land or as an inherent aboriginal right."16' Because of the way
Lamer C.J. characterized the claimed right in the Supreme Court, he dealt
only with the inherent right argument, not with the Aboriginal title argu-
ment. However, the title argument was dealt with in the Court of Appeal by
Osborne J.A., who delivered the unanimous judgment. Relying on
Macfarlane and Wallace JJ.A.'s judgments in Delgamuukw, 62 he con-
cluded that the Aboriginal title to the reserve lands could not "be reasona-
bly viewed so as to give rise to the broad aboriginal right to manage the use
of their land asserted by the appellants. The aboriginal right, in my opinion,
must be looked at more narrowly; it is activity and site specific."' 63 Os-
borne J.A. limited Aboriginal title, even where reserve lands are concerned,
to 'rights which are integral to, or connected with, traditional aboriginal
practices, and land use."' 6 He accordingly dismissed the Aboriginal title
argument, as there was "no evidence to support a conclusion that gambling
generally or high stakes gambling of the sort in issue here, were [sic] part
of the First Nations' historic cultures and traditions, or an aspect of their
use of their land."' 65
With all due respect, Osborne J.A. misapplied Macfarlane and
Wallace JJ.A.'s judgments, as they did not include reserve lands in their
analyses of Aboriginal land rights.' 66 Moreover, his views on the nature of
161. Id. at 830. See R. v. Pamajewon and Jones (1994) 120 D.L.R.4th 475 (Ont.C.A.).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
163. R. v. Pamajewon and Jones (1994) 120 D.L.R.4th 475,491. Note that the Crown did not
dispute the existence of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations' Aboriginal title to their
reserve lands: id. at 487.
164. Id. at 490.
165. Id. at491.
166. In his discussion of "Ownership", which he dealt with separately from "Aboriginal
rights", Macfarlane J.A. accepted the trial judge's finding that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
had not established "the requisite exclusive possession of land to make out their claim for own-
ership except in locations already within reserves": Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993)
104 D.L.R.4th 470, 499 (emphasis added). Wallace J.A. also dealt separately with "Aboriginal
right of ownership of land" and "Aboriginal right of occupation and use of traditional lands -
aboriginal title": id. at 581-86, 586-89. Under the first heading, at 582, he observed:
The trial judge, after considering the evidence, concluded that the interest of
the plaintiffs' ancestors at the time of British sovereignty was, except for
village sites, a non-exclusive use of a designated portion of the territory for
aboriginal subsistence purposes.... Since village sites were for the most part
within the Indian Reserves and not subject to this litigation, the trial judge
declined to make any specific order regarding them. [emphasis added]
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the Aboriginal title to reserve lands are inconsistent with the more recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Blueberry River Indian Band,
where the Indian interest in reserve lands was taken to include oil and gas,
even though the Aboriginal people in question had made no use of those
resources.' 67 In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the In-
dian interest in reserve lands generally entails all-encompassing rights of
use and enjoyment, including all the resources on and under those lands.168
As we have seen, this has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Delgamuukw with respect to all Aboriginal title lands, whether
located within reserves or not, with the qualification that the lands cannot
be used in ways that are inconsistent with use and enjoyment by future
generations. 169
There is, however, a distinction between direct use and enjoyment of
the land itself, and other activities that might take place on the land, but
would not normally be considered use of the land as such. Hunting and
fishing, pasturing domestic animals, growing crops, extracting minerals,
cutting timber, and the like would be direct uses of land. Constructing a
house or other building might be thought of as a direct use as well, but
every activity that took place inside that house or building would hardly be
regarded as a use of the land itself.'70 For example, constructing a commu-
nity center might be a direct use of land, but the various activities con-
ducted there, which might include bingo, would at best be indirect uses.
167. See supra note 92.
168. See McNeil, supra note 37, at 148-51.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 86-107.
170. This kind of distinction can be found in case law dealing with the authority of munici-
palities in relation to zoning and regulation of businesses. By-law making authority to license
and regulate businesses does not include authority to control the use and esthetic appearance of
land, as these are separate legislative functions. See Re Cities Service Oil Co. and City of King-
ston (1956) 5 D.L.R.2d 126 (Ont. H.C.); Texaco Canada v. Corporation of Vanier [1981] 1
S.C.R. 254. Nor does authority to control the use of land through zoning permit regulation of
businesses under the guise of zoning. See Jensen v. Corporation of Surrey (1989) 47 M.P.L.R.
192, .194, 196 (B.C.S.C.), where Spencer J. held that zoning authority can be used to "regulate
within zones, the uses, siting, size and dimensions of buildings", but cannot be relied upon to
control "how many people may participate in the use at a time without reference to siting, size
or dimension," as that "purports to control the way in which the business is carried on within
the premises" (emphasis added). I am grateful to Professor Toni Williams for her valuable
assistance on this point. Moreover, Canadian jurisprudence relating to Indian reserves also
supports this distinction. Under s.91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.),
c.3, the Canadian Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians". As a result, provincial legislation relating to use and possession of lands cannot, of
its own force, apply on reserves. See Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises (1970) 74
W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.); Derrickson v. Derrickson [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285; Paul v. Paul [19861 1
S.C.R. 306. However, a business conducted in a building on a reserve, such as manufacturing
shoes, can be subject to provincial legislation, as the running of the business is not a direct use
of the land as such, and so is not within exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Four B Manufactur-
ing v. United Garment Workers of America [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031.
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This distinction between direct and indirect land use provides the
means of limiting the impact of Pamajewon. The appellants argued in the
Court of Appeal that their right of self-government was an incident of their
Aboriginal title, and included jurisdiction to regulate economic activities,
such as gambling, on their reserve lands."' But as we have seen, Osborne
J.A. held that their Aboriginal title did not provide them with an Aboriginal
right to conduct gambling because there was "no evidence to support a
conclusion that gambling generally ... [was] an aspect of their use of their
land."'72 However, nothing in Osborne J.A.'s judgment, nor in the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada, denies Aboriginal peoples a right of self-
government over activities that are aspects of their Aboriginal rights of use
and enjoyment of their lands. It is in this context that the distinction made
above between direct and indirect land use is relevant. Gambling is at best
an indirect use of the land, and so is not an incident of Aboriginal title; ac-
cording to Osborne J.A., jurisdiction over it therefore cannot be claimed by
virtue of that title.' 73 But as the Supreme Court of Canada held in Delga-
muukw, 174 direct uses of the land, which would include utilization of wild
game and fish, pasturing of domestic animals, agriculture, extraction of
natural resources, constructing buildings, and so on, can be incidents of
Aboriginal title, and so they should support a right of self-government over
those activities.
It might, however, be argued that an Aboriginal title which includes a
right to engage in those kinds of direct uses of the land does not necessarily
entail governmental powers over those uses. Following this argument, to
have a right of self-government with respect to those uses the Aboriginal
claimants would have to go further and prove that their ancestors regulated
those activities." s In my opinion, the fallacy in this argument is that it fails
to take account of Aboriginal title's communal nature. Canadian courts,
including the Ontario Court of Appeal in Pamajewon,176 have consistently
held that Aboriginal rights generally, and Aboriginal land rights in par-
ticular, are communal.'77 While exercisable by individuals, they are vested
171. R. v. Pamajewon and Jones (1994) 120 D.L.R.4th 475,487.
172. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
173. However, this would not preclude a claim to an Aboriginal right to gamble as a free-
standing Aboriginal right. See discussion of Adams and C6t supra text accompanying notes
78-83. An Aboriginal right of self-government in relation to that right could also be established,
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Pamajewon, if it were proven that the
Aboriginal people in question not only participated in but also regulated gambling prior to
European contact.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 84-107.
175. Recall that in Pamajewon Lamer CJ. intimated that, to have a right of self-government
over gambling, an Aboriginal people would have had to both participate in and regulate gam-
bling. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
176. R. v. Pamajewon and Jones (1994) 120 D.L.R.4th 475,488.
177. See, e.g., Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co., sub nom. Oregon Jack Creek Indian
Band v. Canadian National Railway Co. (1989) 56 D.L.R.4th 404, 410 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Spar-
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in an Aboriginal community as a whole. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.I. not
only affirmed the communal nature of Aboriginal title, but also linked it to
community control over Aboriginal land:
A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally.
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collec-
tive right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with
respect to that land are also made by that community. This is another feature of
aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property
interests. 178
By attributing decision-making power over their lands to Aboriginal na-
tions, Lamer C.J. implicitly acknowledged their right of self-government
with respect to Aboriginal title. Indeed, the collective nature of communal
rights necessitates rule-making bodies and processes for distributing and
regulating the rights within the community. There must, for example, be
rules and mechanisms for deciding which members of the community can
use which lands, and for what purposes. The communal nature of Aborigi-
nal rights therefore presupposes the existence of Aboriginal governments
to distribute the benefits that flow from those rights within the community,
and to regulate how they are exercised.' 79
Historically, the Aboriginal peoples had governments which per-
formed these kinds of functions.'8 ° This was acknowledged by Lamer C.J.
in Delgamuukw. 1 ' Those governments cannot have been legally disem-
row [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1112; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470,
per Macfarlane J.A. at 495, Hutcheon I.A. (dissenting in part) at 756; compare per Lambert
J.A. (dissenting in part) at 648.
178. Delgarmuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 242 (emphasis added). On
the communal nature of Aboriginal title, compare the position in the United States, where the
Supreme Court has held that individuals are capable of holding Indian title. See Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1923); United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314
U.S. 339, 345-46 (1941); United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 50 (1985).
179. Where Indian reserves are concerned, this need has been met (however inadequately and
inappropriately) by federal legislation in the form of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, pro-
viding for band councils which have limited powers to allocate reserve lands to band members
and regulate use of those lands. However, no such provision has been made with respect to
Aboriginal title lands that lie outside reserves.
180. See Address of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, supra note 148; Tom Porter, Traditions of
the Constitution of the Six Nations, in LEROY LIrnE BEAR, MENNO BOLDT AND ANTHONY
LONG, eds. PATHWAYS TO SELF-DETERMINATION: CANADIAN INDIANS AND THE CANADIAN
STATE 14 (1984); Michael Coyle, Traditional Indian Justice in Ontario: A Role for the Pres-
ent? 24 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 605 (1986). As stated in REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL
JusTICE INQUiRY OF MANrrOBA, vol. 2, 18 (1991), "Aboriginal peoples have always had gov-
ernments, laws and some means of resolving disputes within their communities."
181. In his judgment, he referred both to Aboriginal laws, which might include "a land tenure
system or laws governing land use", and to an "aboriginal system of governance". Delga-
muukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,256, 260.
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powered at some magic moment in the past, when the British Crown ac-
quired sovereignty or the Dominion of Canada was created, as the majority
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded in Delgamuukw.'12 As
the communal rights of the Aboriginal peoples continued after colonization
and Confederation, 83 the structures and processes for distributing and
regulating those rights must have continued as well. Otherwise, there
would have been legal chaos within Aboriginal communities.
This can be illustrated by a hypothetical example. Let us suppose an
Aboriginal nation that relied heavily on fish for food had formulated laws,
prior to European colonization, for determining who could fish where,
what kinds and quantities of fish could be taken, and so on. Those laws
were subject to change by the nation, as its needs and the variety and sup-
ply of fish changed, by the exercise of what Europeans would regard as
legislative authority. The laws were administered and enforced by mecha-
nisms established by the nation, amounting to the exercise of executive and
judicial authority. 8 1 When the Europeans arrived, the communal right of
this people to take fish for food would have continued." But if the gov-
ernmental authority of the nation was extinguished, ' 6 the internal legal
means of changing the laws in relation to those rights and their exercise,
and of administering and enforcing them, would have disappeared as well,
as there would have been no way to exercise legislative, executive and ju-
dicial authority within the Aboriginal community. What would be the re-
sult? In theory, the laws in existence at the time of European colonization
probably would have continued,8 7 but given that there would be no inter-
nal legal authority for changing, administering or enforcing them, in prac-
tice no one would have to abide by them."8 The result would be legal
182. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
183. See Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 376-79; Roberts v. Canada [1989] 1
S.C.R. 322,340; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193,242.
184. This is not to suggest that Aboriginal governments would function in ways familiar to
Europeans, or could necessarily be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. The
differences between indigenous North American and European political philosophies and sys-
tems of government are generally profound. See Meno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, Tribal
Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies:. The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indi-
ans, 17 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLrTCAL SCIENCE 537 (1984); Russel Lawrence Barsh, The
Nature and Spirit of North American Political Systems, 10 AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY 191
(1986). However, regardless of divergence in philosophies and structures, Aboriginal govern-
ments would still perform broad functions of distributing and administering entitlements and
resolving conflict within Aboriginal communities. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
185. See R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. C6t6
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
186. Recall that the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw
thought that this occurred by the time of Confederation at the latest. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 142-45.
187. See Walters, supra note 22.
188. Note that external enforcement of Aboriginal laws by Canadian courts would be a possi-
bility, and has in fact occurred in family matters such as marriage and adoption. See, eg., Con-
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chaos within the community, a result which the Supreme Court of Canada,
in a different context, was willing to bend over backwards to avoid by
temporarily suspending a provision of the Canadian Constitution. 8 9 One
would expect the Court to make as great an effort to avoid legal chaos in
Aboriginal communities, especially since no suspension of constitutional
provisions would be involved. 90
Lamer C.J. acknowledged in Van der Peet that the pre-existing laws
and customs of the Aboriginal peoples were not extinguished by European
colonization or the creation of Canada. In this context, he quoted a passage
from Brennan J.'s judgment in the High Court of Australia in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2], containing the following statement "Native title has
its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged
by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a
territory."191 Lamer C.J. expressly approved of this statement:
nolly v. Woolrich (1867) 17 R.J.R.Q. 75, 82 (Que. S.C), affirmed sub nom. Johnstone v. Con-
nolly (1869) 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Que. Q.B.); Re Kitchooalik and Tucktoo (1972) 28 D.L.R. 3d
483 (N.W.T.C.A.); Re Wah-Shee (1975) 57 D.L.R.3d 743 (N.W.T.S.C.); and discussion in
Norman K. Zlotkin, Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law in Canada: Selected
Marriage and Adoption Cases [1984] 4 CANADIAN NATIVE LAW REPORTER 1. However, given
general lack of judicial knowledge of and respect for Aboriginal laws (for a striking example,
see R. v. St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. (1885) 10 O.R. 196 (Ont Ch.), commented on
in works cited supra note 7), and the fact that there was little attempt to assert jurisdiction of
Canadian courts in Aboriginal communities until well into the nineteenth, and in some regions
the twentieth, centuries (see infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text), this would not be a
realistic solution to the legal disruption in Aboriginal communities. Another possibility would
be clandestine social enforcement, a fictional instance of which was depicted by Anna Lee
Walters, Laws, in THE SuN Is NOT MERciFuL 91 (1985).
189. See Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, where the Court
invoked the fundamental principle of the rule of law to suspend the operation of a provision of
the Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c.3, s.23, requiring that Manitoba statutes be enacted in
French as well as English, for a sufficient time for them to be translated and re-enacted in both
languages.
190. See PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATION, supra note 136, where it is argued that an inherent
Aboriginal right of self-government is not only compatible with, but is also recognized by, the
Constitution. See also CLARK, supra note 136.
191. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 58, quoted in R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 545 (Lamer
CJ.'s emphasis). Note that Brennan J.'s statement has sometimes been misinterpreted to mean
that Native title as against the Crown depends on the laws and customs of the indigenous peo-
ple in question. This is clearly not what he meant, as the High Court in Mabo declared that the
Meriam people (the indigenous claimants in the case) as a community "are entitled as against
the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Is-
lands," even though Moynihan J. had found as a matter of fact, and the High Court did not
question, that "there was apparently no concept of public or general community ownership
among the people of Murray Island, all the land of Murray Island being regarded as belonging
to individuals or groups": 175 C.L.R. 1, per Brennan J. at 22. See also per Toohey J. at 191,
where he observed that "the findings of Moynihan J. do not allow the articulation of a precise
set of rules," but went on to conclude that that did not matter, as "the particular nature of the
rules which govern a society or which describe its members' relationship with land does not
determine the question of traditional land rights." In fact, the High Court appears to have based
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This position is the same as that being adopted here. "[T]raditional laws" and
"traditional customs" are those things passed down, and arising, from the pre-
existing culture and customs of aboriginal peoples.... To base aboriginal title in
traditional laws and customs, as was done in Mabo, is, therefore, to base that
title in the pre-existing societies of aboriginal peoples. This is the same basis as
that asserted here for aboriginal rights.'
92
But in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. modified this by specifying that Aborigi-
nal title is derived from exclusive occupation of land prior to acquisition of
sovereignty by the Crown. 9' In proving occupation, both a physical con-
nection with the land and Aboriginal perspectives, expressed in part by
Aboriginal laws, are relevanL' 94 So while Aboriginal law can be used as
evidence of exclusive occupation, the content of Aboriginal title is not de-
termined by that law.' 95 Instead, the occupation itself gives rise to a com-
mon law right of exclusive occupation and use, subject to the inherent
limitation that the lands cannot be used in ways inconsistent with future use
and enjoyment by the Aboriginal people in question.' 96
Lamer C.J.'s judgment in Delgamuukw therefore seems to limit the
relevance of Aboriginal law, in the context of an Aboriginal title claim, to
supporting the occupation upon which that title depends. However, that is
only the external relevance of Aboriginal law, as against the Crown in re-
lation to which the title is claimed. Within the Aboriginal community,
Aboriginal laws relating to land would continue to have the same internal
relevance and vitality as they would have had prior to acquisition of Crown
sovereignty. '97 But for the continuance of those laws to be meaningful and
effective, the mechanisms within the community for administering and
enforcing them, and arguably for changing them, would have to continue
as well.
198
the Native title of the Meriam people on their exclusive occupation of land: see per Brennan J.
at 51-52. Compare Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (H.C. Aust.). For more
detailed discussion, see Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights, supra note 75, at 138-44.
192. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,546.
193. See Delgamukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 246, 253. This ap-
pears to be consistent with the actual decision in Mabo, if not with the above quotation: see
supra note 191 and accompanying text.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99, 111-12.
195. For further support for the latter point, see Slattery, supra note 111, at 745-48.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 94-134.
197. For further discussion, see Slattery, supra note 11, at 745; McNeil, supra note 37, at
153.
19s. The necessity for maintaining the ability of an indigenous community to change its laws
after British colonization was acknowledged by the Privy Council in the context of Maori cus-
tomary adoption in New Zealand in Hineiti Rirerire Arani v. Public Trustee (1919), [1840-
1932] N.Z.P.C.C. 1, 6:
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A further argument supports the conclusion reached above that Abo-
riginal governments were not legally disempowered by European coloni-
zation and the creation of Canada, but instead retained broad authority to
change, administer and enforce Aboriginal laws in relation to lands as a
necessary consequence of the continuance of Aboriginal land rights. We
have seen that Aboriginal rights were recognized and affirmed by section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.' In Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. ac-
knowledged, in the context of section 35(1), that "[a]boriginal title is the
aspect of aboriginal rights related specifically to aboriginal claims to land;
it is the way in which the common law recognizes aboriginal land
rights."'2°" This means that Aboriginal title was accorded constitutional
protection in 1982 in those parts of Canada where it had not previously
been extinguished."' This was confirmed in Delgamuukw, where Lamer
C.J. stated that "Aboriginal title at common law is protected in its full form
by s.35(1). ' 2O2 As a consequence, it can no longer be extinguished,203 at
least without the consent of the Aboriginal titleholders. However, like other
Aboriginal rights, it can still be regulated and infringed by federal (and
possibly provincial 2° ) legislation, but only if the legislation meets a strict
test of justification.2 5 The effect of this is to insulate Aboriginal rights,
It may well be that ... the Maoris as a race may have some internal power of
self-government enabling the tribe or tribes by common consent to modify
their customs, and that the custom of such a race is not to be put on a level
with the custom of an English borough or other local area which must stand
as it always has stood, seeing that there is no quasi-legislative internal
authority which can modify it.
It was accepted in Mabo as well that the laws and customs of an indigenous community in
relation to land could be changed by the community after the acquisition of British sovereignty:
Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, per Brennan J. at 61, Deane and Gaudron JJ.
at 110, Toohey J. at 192. As was recognized in Hineiti Rirerire Arani, this implies the continu-
ance of some kind of legislative authority within the community, despite the refusal of Chief
Justice Mason, sitting alone, to envisage that possibility in Coe v. Commonwealth (1993) 68
A.L.J.R. 110 (H.C. Aust.); see also Walker v. New South Wales (1994) 69 A.LJ.R. 11 (H.C.
Aust.); Thorpe v. Commonwealth of Australia [No. 3] (1997) 71 A.LJ.R. 767 (H.C. Aust.). See
generally HENRY REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON RACE, STATE AND
NATION (1996).
199. See supra text accompanying note 36.
200. R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 540.
201. The words "existing aboriginal rights" in s.35.(1) were interpreted to mean Aboriginal
rights that had not been extinguished by "clear and plain" sovereign intent before the enactment
of that provision. See R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1091-93, 1099.
202. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 249.
203. See R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,538.
204. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 260-72. For com-
mentary, see Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal
and Provincial Jurisdiction, 61 SASKATCHEWAN LAW REVIEW 431 (1998).
205. This test was first laid down in R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. It has since been
applied by the Supreme Court in other cases. See supra note 36.
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA
including Aboriginal title, from interference by non-Aboriginal govern-
ments, unless those governments can prove "a compelling and substantial
[legislative] objective," and show that the interference is "consistent with
the Crown's fiduciary obligation to aboriginal peoples."2' As a general
rule, this means that the objective should be met with as little impact on
Aboriginal rights as possible."0 7
Application of the justificatory test to Aboriginal title means that non-
Aboriginal governments are constitutionally barred from exercising the
kind of control 'over Aboriginal lands that they exercise over non-
Aboriginal lands. Any controls that infringe Aboriginal title will be invalid
unless the test is met. As the onus of proof of justification is on the Crown,
there is a presumption of invalidity that "may place a heavy burden on the
Crown."20 Section 35(1) therefore has the effect of creating a constitu-
tional space for Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights that non-
Aboriginal governments cannot easily invade.'(' Within that space, the
rights vested in an Aboriginal community can be exercised relatively
freely, without unjustified outside interference. But given that those rights
are communal, for social harmony to be preserved the community has to
have rules and mechanisms for their distribution and regulation. As dis-
cussed above, this necessitates Aboriginal governments. So constitutionali-
zation of Aboriginal rights reinforces the need for Aboriginal governments
by making the arguments in their favor all the more compelling. 10
II. THE TERRiTORIAL RIGHTS OF THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA
Up to this point, I have accepted the basic paradigm that the courts
have created for Aboriginal rights in Canada, and shown how one can work
within that paradigm to establish broad land rights and find space for an
inherent right of self-government. I now want to take another tack, and
suggest that the approach the Canadian courts have been taking to Aborigi-
206. R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, 133; see also R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723,
762-63; R. v. C6t [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 189; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153
D.L.R.4th 193,260-66.
207. SeeR. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1114-19; R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723,
763-75. For a critique of the manner in which the justification test was applied in Gladstone,
see Kent McNeil, How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples
Be Justfied?, 8:2 CONSITUTIONAL FORUM 33 (1997).
208. See R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,1110,1114,1119 (quoted passage), 1121.
209. As Dickson CJ. and La Forest J. said in Sparrow, constitutional recognition of Aborigi-
nal rights "gives a measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on legisla-
tive power." Id. at 1110.
210. For another slant on this argument, see Envisaging Constitutional Space, supra note
136, suggesting that s.35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982, created a constitutional space for
Aboriginal governments to operate and make laws regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights; to the
extent that Aboriginal governments filled that space, federal and provincial laws infringing
those rights would be excluded.
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nal rights is too narrow. I am going to propose an alternative approach that
goes beyond land rights and self-government, and acknowledges the lim-
ited territorial sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples as nations within Can-
ada. The main problem I see with the judicial decisions is that they tend to
take a particularized approach to Aboriginal claims, especially to self-
government claims. Except where Aboriginal title is concerned, Aboriginal
peoples are being asked to establish very specific rights, one by one, on the
basis of historical practices, customs and traditions. While I have suggested
a way of limiting the effect of this narrow approach where Aboriginal title
is established, it still forecloses the possibility of broadly-based governance
rights stemming from the Aboriginal peoples' existence as independent
nations prior to European colonization. The solution to this problem that I
am going to outline tentatively here, and develop in future work, takes ac-
count of the reality of Aboriginal nationhood. It subsumes all Aboriginal
rights, including land rights and self-government, under one all-
encompassing right to territory. In so doing, it places Aboriginal assertions
of sovereignty at the forefront as the primary issue to be addressed.
In Van der Peet, Lamer CJ. emphasized that the first thing to be taken
into account in identifying and defining Aboriginal rights is the perspective
of the Aboriginal people claiming the rights." While this sounds like a
laudable approach, in the context of self-government it appears to be
mainly empty rhetoric. This is revealed in the Pamajewon decision, where
we have seen that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations claimed "a
broad right to manage the use of their reserve lands".212 Lamer C.J. disre-
garded their perspective on the nature of their rights in that case, and char-
acterized the claimed right narrowly as a "right to participate in, and to
regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the reservation.' 2 3 If Lamer
C.J. had taken the Aboriginal claimants' perspective seriously, he would
have inquired into whether their Ojibwa ancestors had generally managed
the use of their lands as an independent nation prior to European coloniza-
tion, which would have involved the issue of Ojibwa sovereignty. By dis-
missing the claimants' perspective and particularizing their claim in the
way he did, Lamer C.J. was able to avoid this fundamental issue.
I think that Lamer C.J.'s direction that the perspectives of the Aborigi-
nal peoples must to be taken into account should be taken seriously.1 4
Generally speaking, those perspectives are fundamentally opposed to the
211. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
212. R. v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, 834; see supra text accompanying note 157.
213. Id. at 833: see supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
214. Related to this is the assertion of Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. in Sparrow, made in the
context of justification of legislative infringements of Aboriginal rights, that Aboriginal peoples
should be treated "in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously." On the same page,
they went on to say "that recognition and affirmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the
rights of aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and indeed all Canadians." See
R. v. Sparrow (1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1119.
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particularized approach to Aboriginal rights that the Supreme Court took in
Pamajewon. Rather than classifying and compartmentalizing the physical
world and legal rights in the way Euro-Canadians tend to do, Aboriginal
peoples generally have a more holistic world-view. Where their Aboriginal
rights are concerned, this means that they generally would not distinguish
land rights from self-government. 215 For them, the two are intimately con-
nected and part of a larger whole, so any attempt to separate them distorts
and diminishes their Aboriginal rights. 2 6 Combining Aboriginal land rights
and self-government into an over-arching right to territory with a sovereign
dimension, in the way I am suggesting, is, I think, consistent with this Abo-
riginal perspective, whereas Lamer C.J.'s particularized approach is not.
Conceptualizing Aboriginal rights in terms of a broad right to limited
territorial sovereignty is also consistent with the history of European-
Aboriginal relations in North America, a history that has been acknowl-
edged by the highest courts on both sides of the Canadian-American bor-
der. Until 1871 in the United States and at least 1923 in Canada, a promi-
nent feature of those relations was the making of treaties. 17 In R. v.
Sioui,21s the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the nation-to-nation
quality of a treaty entered into between the Hurons of Lorette and the Brit-
ish in 1760. Referring to that historical period, Lamer J. (as he then was),
delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, observed:
We can conclude from the historical documents that both Great Britain and
France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and played a
large enough role in North America for it to be good policy to maintain rela-
tions with them very close to those maintained between sovereign nations.
215. See, e.g., David Ahenakew, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: The Impossible and
Unnecessary Task of Identification and Definition, in MENNO BOLDT AND J. ANTHONY LONG,
eds., THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 24, at 24-25
(1985); Fred Plain, A Treatise on the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples on the Continent of
North America, id. 31, at 32-34; Peter Ittinuar, The Inuit Perspective on Aboriginal Rights, id.
47, at 47. Boldt and Long, id. at 319, observed. "The concepts of aboriginal rights and sover-
eign Indian self-government are considered by most Indian leaders to be virtually synony-
mous."
216. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, vol. 2,
RSTRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP, part 2, at 448-64 (1996). See also Michael Asch and
Norman Zlotkin, "Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for Comprehensive Claims Nego-
tiations", in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS, supra note 7, 208, at 214-18.
217. In the United States, the practice of making treaties was terminated in 1871 by the Ap-
propriation Act, c.120, 16 Stat. 544, at 566, codified 25 U.S.C. § 71. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, at 105-07, 127. In Canada, the last agreements that were called treaties by the
Canadian Government were the Williams Treaties of 1923, but adhesions to existing treaties
took place after that, and modem land claims agreements are really treaties by another name, as
the following subsection of the Constitution Act, 1982, makes clean "35.(3) For greater cer-
tainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights' includes rights that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired."
218. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
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The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of
each Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change
sides. When these efforts met with success, they were incorporated in treaties
of alliance or neutrality. This clearly indicates that the Indian nations were re-
garded in their relations with the European nations which occupied North
America as independent nations.
2 1 9
Similarity in the United States, Marshall C.J. recognized in Worcester
v. Georgia that the "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities. 220 He continued:
[t]he very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct
from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanc-
tioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations [entered into mainly by the
British Crown], and consequently admits their rank among those powers capa-
ble of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves,
having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are ap-
plied to all in the same sense.221
Lamer J. cited Worcester v. Georgia in Sioui, but quoted a different pas-
sage:
Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting the
territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and
such her practical exposition of the charters she had granted: she considered
them as nations capable of maintaining relations of peace and war; of govern-
ing themselves, under her protection; and she made treaties with them, the ob-
ligation of which she acknowledged.2 2
The Sioui and Worcester decisions reveal judicial awareness of the
actual circumstances in North America, and a willingness to take those
219. Id. at 1052-53.
220. 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515, 559 (1832). See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1(1831).
221. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 560 (1832).
222. R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1054 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
548-49, Lamer CJ.'s emphasis). It is worth noting that, in Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ. again
refened to the Aboriginal peoples as nations, both in past and present contexts: for a significant
instance of this, in relation to his acknowledgement of their decision-making authority respect-
ing Aboriginal lands, see supra text accompanying note 178. For other such references, see
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 153 D.L.R.4th 193, 227-28, 231-32, 234, 237, 239,
258-59,265,272-73.
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circumstances into account when dealing with issues of Aboriginal rights.
Marshall C.J. had lived through the American Revolution and the War of
1812 (he was born in 1755, on the eve of the Seven Years War), and knew
perfectly well that the Indian nations could be "formidable enemies, or ef-
fective friends."' The European nations asserted sovereignty in North
America by discovery, 4 but had little interest in, and were initially inca-
pable of, interfering with the Indian Nations. Marshall C.J. was uncategori-
cal about the British policy of non-interference in Worcester:
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of
our country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the inter-
nal affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers,
who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances.... [The
king] purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded
into the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self government, so far
as respected themselves only.
2 5
The same policy of non-interference was followed in British North
America outside the Thirteen Colonies and in Canada, well into the nine-
teenth, and in some areas the twentieth, centuries.ue For example, regard-
ing Rupert's Land, the vast territory claimed by the British Crown and
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company by Royal Charter in 1670, the Gov-
ernor of that Company, Sir George Simpson, in testimony before the Select
Committee of the British House of Commons on the Company's affairs in
1857, answered as follows:
[Mr. Grogan] What privileges or rights do the native Indians possess strictly
223. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546 (1832).
224. Marshall CJ. held that discovery gave the discovering European nation a title "as
against all other European governments", and that the rights of the original inhabitants "to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished". See Johnson v.
M'ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823). However, he clearly thought the Indian na-
tions retained authority to govern themselves, as he admitted "their power to change their laws
and usages": id. at 593. Moreover, he said that a "person who purchases lands from the Indians,
within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased;
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws": id. (emphasis added).
225. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 (6 Pet.) U.S. 515, 547 (1832).
226. See, e.g., Hamar Foster, Forgotten Arguments: Aboriginal Title and Sovereignty in
Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases, 21 MANrrOBA LAW JOuRNAL 343 (1992) (concluding that
Imperial statutes extending the jurisdiction of the courts of Upper and Lower Canada to adja-
cent British territory did not make Aboriginal persons who were not employed by fur trading
companies subject to English criminal law). On the virtual absence of Canadian jurisdiction in
much of the North into the twentieth century, see RENt FUMOLEAU, AS LONG AS THIS LAND
SHALL LAST. A HiSTORY OF TREATY 8 AND TREATY 11, 1870-1939, 139 (1973); Sidney L.
Harring, The Rich Men of the Country: Canadian Law in the Land of the Copper Inuit, 1914-
1930,21 OTIAWA LAW REvIEW 1 (1989); McNeil, supra note 119, at 119-20.
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applicable to themselves? -[Simpson] They are perfectly at liberty to do what
they please; we never restrain Indians.
[Grogan] Is there any difference between their position and that of the half-
breeds? - [Simpson] None at all. They hunt and fish, and live as they please.
They look to us for their supplies, and we study their comfort and convenience
as much as possible; we assist each other.
[Lord Stanley] You exercise no authority whatever over the Indian tribes?
[Simpson] None at all....
[Mr. Bell] Do you mean that, possessing the right of soil over the whole of
Rupert's Land, you do not consider that you possess any jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of that soil? - [Simpson] No, I am not aware that we do. We exer-
cise none, whatever right we possess under our charter.
[Bell] Then is it the case that you do not consider that the Indians are under
your jurisdiction when any crimes are committed by the Indians upon the
Whites? - [Simpson] They are under our jurisdiction when crimes are com-
mitted upon the Whites, but not when committed upon each other, we do not
meddle with their wars.
22 7
Even in British Columbia, where the majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal concluded in Delgamuukw that Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
governmental authority had been extinguished at the latest in 1871, 2 there
appears to have been no real attempt to impose British or Canadian juris-
diction or law on those peoples prior to the 1880s. Up to then, as pointed
out by Hutcheon J.A. in his dissent in that case, "only the tribal laws of the
Indians [had] prevailed.
229
In French Canada as well, prior to the cession of New France to Brit-
ain in 1763, it appears that the French authorities did not interfere with the
227. Minutes of Evidence, at 91-92, in HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF TiE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON THE HuDsoN's BAY COMPANY (1857). Note that Simpson's response regarding
the non-application of criminal law corresponds with the approach taken by the United States
Supreme Court in Ex pane Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), where it was held that federal
criminal law did not apply to acts committed by one Indian against another in Indian territory.
The effect of that decision was reversed where serious crimes are concerned in 1885 by the
Appropriations Act, c.341, 23 Stat. 362, at 385, codified 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242. See
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 300-04; SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE:
AMERICAN INDIAN SOvEREIGNTY, 'TIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINmEEm
CENTURY (1994).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
229. Quoting from instructions issued by the Honourable A. Davie, Attorney-General of
British Columbia, to the Superintendent of Provincial Police on July 16, 1888. See Delga-
muukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 D.L.R.4th 470, 762. For an illuminating account of the
application of Anglo-Canadian homicide law to the Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia, see
Hamar Foster, The Queen's Law Is Better Than Yours: International Homicide In Early British
Columbia, in JIM PHILLIPS, TINA Loo, AND SUSAN LEwTHwAITE, eds., CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JuSTCE, vol. 5 of ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW, THE OSGOODE SOCIETY SERIES
41(1994).
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internal governance of the Indian nations living within the territories
claimed by the French king. In Connolly v. Woolrich, a well-known but
judicially-neglected case decided by the Quebec Superior Court in 1867,
Monk J. observed:
Neither the French Government, nor any of its colonists or their trading asso-
ciations, ever attempted, during an intercourse of over two hundred years, to
subvert or modify the laws and usages of the aboriginal tribes, except where
they had established colonies and permanent settlements, and, then only by per-
suasion.230
Supporting Monk J.'s statement with historical documentation, at the end
of an illuminating article on "French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood
during the French R6gime" Cornelius Jaenen concluded as follows:
On the international level, France like other European powers involved in colo-
nization of America asserted her sovereign rights over a vast continental ex-
panse. At the regional level, dealing with "independent" peoples, she refrained
from interference with original territorial rights, customs, and mode of life.
French laws since 1664 applied only to colonists and were not imposed on na-
tive inhabitants.23
My point is that the Sioui and Worcester decisions reflect the historical
reality of French and British colonization of North America. Those Euro-
pean powers asserted sovereignty over the territories occupied by the Abo-
riginal nations, but did not interfere with their autonomy within those ter-
ritories. What was being respected was not just land rights or limited gov-
ernmental authority, but territorial sovereignty under the over-arching sov-
ereignty of the French and British Crowns, and later the United States.
Marshall C.J. made this perfectly clear in Worcester. Referring to congres-
sional Acts passed to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, he
said that those Acts
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only ac-
230. (1867) 17 RJ.R.Q. 75, 82, affirmed sub nom. Johnstone v. Connolly (1869) 17 RJ.R.Q.
266 (Que. Q.B.).
231. In J.R. MILLER, ed., SwEET PROMISES: A READER ON INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN
CANADA 38 (1991). See also WJ. Eccles, Sovereignty-Association, 1500-1783, 65 CANADIAN
HISTORICAL REvIEw 475 (1984); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES,
AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815 (1991); PARTNERS IN
CONFEDERATION, supra note 136, at 10-12.
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knowledged, but guarantied by the United States.
2 32
He went on to liken the Indian nations to states which place themselves
under the protection of a more powerful state, without surrendering their
independence and their rights of self-government. 23 Applying these con-
clusions to the Cherokee nation, he said it "is a distinct community, occu-
pying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force."234
Despite fluctuations in presidential, congressional and judicial respect
for Indian territorial rights, the basic principle laid down in Worcester of
Indian territorial sovereignty within the United States has been maintained
by the Supreme Court.2 35 In Canada, however, we have seen that the courts,
while acknowledging that the Aboriginal peoples have land rights, have
been reluctant to embrace the concept of self-government, let alone accept
that the Aboriginal peoples have territorial rights with sovereign dimen-
sions. 6 Lamer J.'s decision in Sioui moved toward the concept of Abo-
riginal territorial sovereignty, but his more recent decision in Pamajewon
signals a disappointing retreat from that promising initiative. In Van der
Peet and Pamajewon, the Supreme Court shifted its historical focus, from
the relations between the Aboriginal peoples and the French and British
Crowns that it began to take account of in Sioui, to the pre-contact prac-
tices, customs and traditions of the Aboriginal peoples themselves. But
close to four hundred years of history cannot be so easily ignored. No Ca-
nadian court has yet come up with a convincing explanation of what hap-
pened to Aboriginal sovereignty, or how that sovereignty can be denied in
light of the Indian treaties which Canada continued to sign after Confed-
eration. While the Supreme Court was able to avoid these issues in its re-
cent decision in Delgamuukw, they will not go away. One day, they will
have to be addressed.
232. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,557 (1832).
233. Id at 561.
234. Id.
235. See supra text accompanying note 1.
236. A notable exception is Connolly v. Woolrich (1867) 17 RJ.R.Q. 75, 84, where Monk J.,
relying on Worcester, held that acquisition of French and British sovereignty, and reception of
their laws, did not abrogate "the territorial rights, political organization, such as it was, or the
laws and usages of the Indian tribes."
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